Thursday, 23 July 2015

Persian Pivot: In Plain English, It’s A Done Deal Modi must take care to Act West, too

 RAMESH RAMACHANDRAN 
Photo: PIB
Photo: PIB
 “will pay a heavy price for a total disregard of  concerns vis-a-vis . It just will not fly in this body and they need to be told that in plain English, not in diplomatic English”, was how Tom Lantos, the seniormost Democrat on the foreign affairs committee of the lower House of the United States’ legislature, spoke during a 2005 hearing on the - civil nuclear cooperation agreement. For good measure, he described Natwar Singh as dense and warned that if there was no strategic congruence between  and Washington on , then the bilateral relationship would go down the tubes.
While that fate did not befall the  ties, what literally went down the tubes was ’s engagement with . Over the next decade, while China and maintained their ties with  on an even keel (the fruits of which they are now reaping),  went out of its way to antagonise  first by voting against it in the  (a counter view is that it was in ’s interest to jettison its ties with in order to save the - ) and subsequently by going slow on some strategically significant infrastructure projects. One is the Chabahar port, located west of the Gwadar port in Pakistan which figures prominently in China’s strategic calculus, and the other is the International North South Transport Corridor which would give  access to Central Asia and Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan.
Earlier this month, another Democrat politician by the name of Barack Obama upended nearly four decades of American foreign policy by entering into a  with , which, it can now be said with a modicum of certainty, is a country whose time has come (and how!). The - detente holds out the tantalising prospect of reordering , the full import and consequences of which are yet to be fully grasped. If borders have been drawn and redrawn in , the nuclear breakthrough with  can be expected to reshape the geopolitics of the region in more ways than one, not least in the manner in which  (responsibly) uses its heft to influence the course of events in the Persian Gulf and the Arab world.
That Obama chose to cut a deal with  without worrying too much about how well it will go down with Israel, Saudi Arabia and other traditional American allies in the Arab world riven by sectarianism (between Shiites and Sunnis) and regional rivalries is a lesson for  in how not to allow yourself to be coerced into a situation where you are forced into choosing one over the other. Also, the collaboration between  and the  in  in spite of their differences and the prospects of them jointly taking on the Islamic State (is) could offer a template for similar creative solutions to problems bedevilling South Asia where a tactical understanding on specific issues can be worth it.
’s diffidence on  over the lost decade (2005 to 2015) is all the more inexcusable given how some key officials in the past maintained that “we believe that we understand  better” (MK Narayanan) and how “the narrative of our relations against the background of our longstanding civilisational ties is therefore one of fundamental complementarities and natural affinities” (Nirupama Rao). The irony becomes stark when one considers that after forcing  to reappraise its ties with countries such as Myanmar and , the  and its allies themselves plunge headlong into courting those very countries; but while they rush in to gain the first-mover advantage,  remains leaden-footed in capitalising on its friendly ties with the countries in question.
No doubt,  coming out of isolation makes ’s life easier in some ways but the signing of the  and the eventual lifting of sanctions will pose a peculiar challenge to . How countries such as Saudi Arabia will react in the months or years to come is not known. Compounding matters for  will be the realisation that  is not going to replace ’s friends in  — Israel, the , Saudi Arabia, etc. For , negotiating the minefield that is  is not going to be easy.

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