India's Modi Hopes to Tamp Down China's Influence in Bangladesh

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will take border-settlement and water-sharing deals to Bangladesh next month as part of his drive to erode Chinese influence in South Asia, although Dhaka is likely to remain dependent on Beijing for military equipment.

India, which has had an uneasy relationship with China for decades, has long fretted over Beijing's military cooperation with its South Asian neighbors, especially Pakistan. It is also worried that China is creating a "string of pearls" across the Indian Ocean by funding port developments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Modi has won parliamentary approval for an agreement that will transfer a small amount of territory to Bangladesh that previous Indian governments failed to ratify for fear of a domestic backlash. The issue dates to British India's partition in 1947.

The prime minister has also persuaded a regional Indian leader to drop her opposition to share water equally from a key river that flows through India before reaching Bangladesh.

"There have been some contentious issues like the land border agreement, which, frankly, we should have done years ago," said an Indian official involved in Modi's June 6-7 visit.

Less attention to migration

The migration of tens of thousands of people from Bangladesh into India has long been a sensitive issue in India, with Modi's Hindu nationalist party making it a key campaign plank.

But since coming to power, Modi has fallen silent on the migration issue and has instead focused on securing India's strategic objectives in Bangladesh.

Srikanth Kondapalli, a China expert at New Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University, said that China had built close ties with Bangladesh as part of its South Asia diplomacy and that this was a concern for India.

"The number of PLA visits to Bangladesh is nearly the same as to India," he said, referring to China's People's Liberation Army. "Modi is trying to counter it with his neighborhood outreach."

Modi has reached out to all of India's neighbors since he took office a year ago except Pakistan.

But any Indian concerns about Bangladesh's growing military ties to China, including the planned sale of two Chinese diesel-electric submarines, are likely to fall on deaf ears in Dhaka, said a former Bangladeshi military officer and an Indian expert.

Dhaka a top customer for Beijing

China was the source of 82 percent of Bangladesh's arms purchases from 2009 to 2013, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), making Dhaka one of the top three buyers of Chinese weapons in the world.

SIPRI data showed Bangladesh bought anti-ship missiles, tanks, fighter aircraft and other arms from China between 2008 and 2012. Last year, it commissioned two new frigates from China.

"China became the largest supplier of military hardware to Bangladesh when relations with India were strained," said retired Bangladeshi Brigadier General Shahedul Anam Khan.

A government official in Dhaka said Bangladesh's first submarines, costing $206 million in total, could be delivered before 2019. China was expected to provide training, said Chinese experts on the country's ties with South Asia.

What worries Indian military planners is that China might see Bangladesh, which shares the Bay of Bengal with India and Myanmar, as an ideal place for its warships and submarines to dock.

India was alarmed last year when Chinese submarines did the same in Sri Lanka. A new government in Colombo has since ruled out submarine visits in the near future.

China's Defense Ministry's had no immediate comment on military ties with Bangladesh. Cooperation between the two countries was normal, China's Foreign Ministry said.

Bangladesh has never hosted a naval ship from China and has no plans to, according to a government official.

Port plans

China is helping Bangladesh upgrade its main Chittagong port while the China Harbor Engineering Company has been seen as the front-runner to win a contract to build an $8 billion deep-water port on Sonadia island off the Bangladeshi city of Cox's Bazaar in the Bay of Bengal. India's Adani Group is also bidding for the project.

The Bangladeshi government official said it was unclear when a decision on Sonadia would be made, adding that port operators from the United Arab Emirates and the Netherlands were also interested.

"China, in my opinion, is the best option," said Munshi Faiz Ahmad, a former Bangladesh ambassador to China, adding that Chinese firms had built big infrastructure projects in a number of countries, including Bangladesh, where they have constructed power plants, bridges and roads.

The Indian navy is watching China's growing military ties with Bangladesh closely. It's setting up missile batteries and radar surveillance on Sagar island, near the India-Bangladesh border, with plans to develop a deep sea port there that would provide easy access to the Bay of Bengal, military officials said.

"The worry is not Bangladesh's military capabilities," said Pinaki Chakravarty, a former Indian ambassador to Dhaka. "It is about Chinese influence next door."

Modi 365: Repositioning India globally

One the occasion of the BJP government’s one-year anniversary, Neelam Deo, director, Gateway House, delivered a series of lectures across the U.S., analysing Modi’s foreign policy. His energetic style, she said, has created several milestones—including a revival of relations with the U.S. and Russia, and a new approach to China and to India’s neighbourhood—that can cumulatively transform India’s growth trajectory. This is an abridged version of her lecture:

BY Neelam Deo 

DIRECTOR, GATEWAY HOUSE

In his first year as prime minister, Narendra Modi has had to craft a foreign policy in a global setting that has been transformed by the rapid rise of the Chinese economy and its increasing belligerence towards its Asian neighbours. Meanwhile, Russia’s stand-off with NATO has forced it to lean towards China; West Asia is in turmoil; and the retreat of the remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan will encourage terrorism emanating from Pakistan that primarily targets India but has also become global.

It is in this complex and changing global setting that Modi has emerged as a bold deal-maker—with flexible and strategic negotiations with the U.S. that are balanced by a reaching out to China and rejuvenating relations with Russia.

Modi’s visits to Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—three of India’s six South Asian neighbours—have restored warmth to relations with these countries too, at a time when China is heavily cultivating its own ties with these countries. India believes that China’s lavish investments and armaments for its South Asian neighbours is an “encirclement” of India.

In this fluid Asian strategic backdrop, the U.S. has become Modi’s strategic focus—and India can attain more influence in global security and financial institutions only with American support. Besides, India needs investment and the involvement of American companies in its infrastructure build-out, collaboration in the indigenisation of defence industries, and an enhanced technology partnership between the navies of the two countries.

At present, Russia remains the largest supplier of weapons to India, and it is willing to share high-technology so that India can indigenise its nuclear and defence production sectors. An example of India’s rejuvenated relations with Russia was President Pranab Mukherjee’s presence on May 9 at Russia’s 70th anniversary victory ceremonies to mark the end of World War II, while the West, including Russia’s wartime allies UK and the U.S., stayed away.

At the same time, it is imperative for India to consolidate its working relations with China. But this bilateral equation suffers from a shortfall of trust that has been widened by the 4,050 kilometre un-demarcated border and a trade deficit of approximately $40 billion.

Middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, such as Canada, Australia, and Japan need to balance against the newly-risen China. They recognise that India is the only country in Asia of comparable size and potential—and this is facilitating the building of India’s relations with these countries. All of them also happen to be treaty allies of the U.S.

Among the middle powers, Japan is especially important. Both India and Japan feel the pressure from China and Modi’s warm overtures to Japan early in his term will go a long way. This is evident from Japan’s potential sale of high-technology weapons systems to India, which will make India the first non-treaty ally to receive defence technology from Japan.

The prime minister’s interactions with Canada and Australia have been equally important—both countries are sources of uranium for India’s nuclear energy programme. Additionally, Australia and Japan are also important for the revival of quadrilateral maritime cooperation—along with the U.S.—in the Indo-Pacific. Modi has also reached out to France as a source of high-technology weapon systems, nuclear energy technology, and for support in international institutions.

Closer to home, Modi visited Mauritius and Seychelles—nations that, along with Sri Lanka, are integral to India’s strategy to balance China’s push into the Indian Ocean Region through its proposed Maritime Silk Road project.

In his first year, Modi also made the time to attend meetings of multilateral institutions such as the G20, BRICS, and the East Asia Summit. His pragmatic style helped unlock stalemates at the World Trade Organisation and on climate change issues, while making it clear that India will continue to use coal to generate power, but wants to simultaneously expand investment in solar and wind power.

At the end of one year then, it can be said that Modi has successfully enlarged India’s strategic autonomy by cultivating close relations with its neighbours, with the P5 countries, other middle powers, and Indian Ocean island countries. But Pakistan remains a big conundrum for India.

In terms of inbound investment—which has been a major thrust of Modi’s foreign policy—there is significant progress. The U.S. ($40 billion), Japan ($35 billion), China ($20 billion), and South Korea ($10 billion) have all made commitments from a mix of public and private sources in infrastructure and defence industries. Even if only a small percentage of these investments flow in soon, it will give an impetus to the Indian economy, especially in improving infrastructure and creating employment.

From here on, the best way India can advance its foreign policy will be to secure a high rate of growth as rapidly as possible. The Modi government is working towards this goal through domestic policy reforms that include transparent governance (as seen in the e-auction of telecom spectrum and coal); the abolition of obsolete institutions like the Planning Commission; harmonisation of taxes under the pending Goods and Services Tax; a digitisation of the economy; and the creation of a modest social security net.

In addition, the devolution of more revenue and power to the states is likely to set in motion a cycle of competitive federalism that will make the overall Indian economy more competitive and will add to India’s global strategic weight.

Neelam Deo is Co-founder and Director, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations; She has been the Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast; and former Consul General in New York.

This feature was written exclusively for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive features here.

For interview requests with the author, or for permission to republish, please contact Reetika Joshi at joshi.reetika@gatewayhouse.in oroutreach@gatewayhouse.in or 022 22023371.

© Copyright 2014 Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. All rights reserved. Any unauthorized copying or reproduction is strictly prohibited.”

Blowing Cold: Cold War priorities led the USSR into a peacable equidistance

Since the celebrated visit of Jawaharlal Nehru to the USSR and Khrushchev’s pompous return visit in 1955, the Kremlin had been striving to use India as a core element of the envisaged Soviet alliance with Third World countries. The Soviet calculus was comparatively simple. International cooperation between socialist and ‘young’ Asian and African states under Soviet guidance was expected to strengthen the USSR in its peaceful, but relentless contest for global influence against the US At the same time, the presumed success of soc­ialist development would induce countries like India to embrace the socialist model.

Until the mid-’60s, Soviet ideological calculations yielded at best ambivalent results. In India, the Left wasn’t a real power factor in politics, but had to cope with disintegration. In the international sphere, the US and Great Britain rema­ined influential. Improved Indo-Soviet relations notwithstanding, New Delhi still cherished non-alignment and ref­rai­ned from pro-Soviet commitments in Cold War affairs. Moscow was anxious lest India-Pakistan tensions distracted Indian attention from the anti-imperialist struggle, since the simmering Kashmir conflict was a gateway for enha­n­­ced Anglo-American influence. Besides, the India-Pakistan conflict allowed an anti-­Soviet Beijing to pursue its indepen­dent goals as an emerging global power.

In these interdependent constellations, the USSR carefully registered Pakistani attempts to integrate Moscow into its less pro-Western foreign policy of equidistance. It remained to be seen if Raw­alpindi’s course could prove useful for alleviating Moscow’s problems in nav­ig­ating the troubled waters of regi­onal con­flicts, Sino-Soviet discrepancies, and relentless Cold War manoeuvring. Just as well, Pakistan’s new flexibility could impede the Kremlin’s orientation in South Asian affairs. “For 17 years,” the US administration later on gleefully commented, “The US had had one dog chewing on one leg and another dog chewing on other and if Soviets wanted find out what it was like that was all right with us”. Access to Rus­­sian sources concerning the 1965 India-­Pakistan war is limited. However, declassified documents, memoirs, contemporary official statements and press reports allow for a reconstruction of Soviet deliberations.

At the beginning of 1965, the situation on the subcontinent had become explosive. In April 1965, after Pakistan’s occupation of disputed territories in the Rann of Kutch, India and Pakistan were on the verge of war. British diplomatic initiatives prevented further escalation. Mos­cow remained passive. Its restraint was determined by Cold War considerations. Due to increasing American involvement in Vietnam, the Kremlin sensed new opp­ortunities in its global competitions: by taking a more resolute position in Sou­theast Asia, the USSR wanted to score against Washington’s policy and defend Moscow’s socialist stan­ding against Chi­nese radicalism. Hence, Moscow needed a peaceful South Asia and sympathetic relations with India and Pak­istan. It pre­­ferred not to play an active role in bilateral conflicts, since any kind of Soviet diplomatic activities ran the risk of aro­using suspicion in New Delhi and Raw­alpindi either of Soviet one-sidedness, of expansionist motivations, or of neglect of the interests of traditional partners.

From the Soviet point of view, the start of fighting in August 1965 was the result of western imperialist machinations.

Therefore, official Moscow statements belittled the value of the disputed “uninhabited piece of salt swamps” and stressed the necessity of peaceful reg­­u­­lations. Secondly, in meetings with Pre­sident Ayub Khan and PM Shastri in April and May, Brezhnev took great pains to obtain explicit condemnations of the US policy in Vietnam. The talks revealed that both South Asian leaders pursued their own international agenda. Acc­ording to Soviet sources, Ayub Khan at least indirectly indicated his willingness to guarantee that Western military bases in Pakistan would not be used against the USSR, if Moscow in future sessions of the Security Council was ready to forego vetoing non-Indian Kashmir resolutions. Besides, the Pakistani president was eager to underline common ground with the USSR with regard to Chinese represe­ntation in the Security Council. While Ayub looked for Soviet diplomatic back-­­up for his China and India policy, Shastri expected from his hosts unambiguous statements against supposed anti-Indian Pakistani and Chinese proj­e­cts. The timely de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict corresponded to Moscow’s interests but did not dissolve the contradictions between Soviet, Ind­ian and Pakistani international designs.

From the Soviet point of view, the new fighting in August 1965 was the result of imperialist machinations. By instigating both countries, Western powers torpedoed two prerequisites of the worldwide socialist triumph, namely peace and economic development. The war’s pote­ntial for capitalist or Chinese interfere­nce in the vicinity of the USSR was also a worry. Again, the Kremlin’s capability to shape the course of events was limited. Initially, Soviet representatives urged New Delhi to end Pakistani infiltration by Indian means quickly. Then, at the end of August, Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin resorted to anti-imperialist appeals. New Delhi and Rawalpindi ignored the Soviet requests, and in early September the battle for Kashmir had developed into a full-fledged war. A Sov­iet offer of good services from September 4 as well as resolutions of the Security Council between September 4-6, which were adopted with Soviet consent, went unheeded. In the meantime, Beijing started its pro-Pakistan diplomatic offe­nsive against the Soviet-American peace alliance. Chinese anti-Indian ultimatums of September 8 and 16 threatened to prolong and intensify the fighting. Besi­des, China’s manoeuvres were suited to undermine fragile Soviet prestige in Paki­stan and to force India to take refuge in the capitalist camp. The USSR resp­onded by intensifying its two-way app­roach of supporting UN efforts and pro­pagandising a Soviet mediating role for future negotiations.

New Delhi and Rawalpindi demurred, but agreed to the Tashkent conference. In preparation, both sides conveyed their main ideas about past and future bilateral relations. While India sought diploma­tic-military safeguards against perceived Pakistani aggression and was inclined to preserve newly won strategic positions in Kashmir, Pakistan insisted on a satisfying regulation of the Kashmir question. According to Soviet records, Bhutto suggested that Pakistan, after a ‘dignified’ solution of the Kashmir problem, would quit the anti-Communist cento and seato alliances. Possible Moscow interpretations about Pakistani readiness to accept a partition of Kashmir and a final settlement proved to be premature. “Both sides”, Moscow informed East German Communists, “came with rigid positions to Tashkent and...did not dem­onstrate any readiness to compromise”. Pakistan repudiated Indian proposals of a no-war pact. Furthermore, the Pakistani delegation did not agree to the partition of Kashmir, but demanded a “mechanism for the solution of disputed questions”, including the Kashmir problem. Only at the last minute, Kosygin and Gromyko found acceptable formulas for the common declaration. Due to the archival sit­­u­­ation, one can only speculate whether Indian and Pakistani hopes about future Soviet aid imp­roved their willingness to cooperate. The Tashkent declaration inc­luded the with­drawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to pre-war positions. Nei­ther side renou­nced fundamental pos­­­­itions. Bilateral relati­ons restarted to deteriorate as early as spring 1966. The USSR limited itself to unimpressive app­eals. Given the deep mutual distrust of the antagonised powers, the Tashkent con­ference did not constitute a starting point for a new quality of relations in the Indo-Soviet-Pakistani triangle, which would have served the USSR’s and global socialist aims. Instead, at the beg­inning of the ’70s, the dynamics of South Asian and foreign developments com­pe­lled Moscow to fundamental red­e­­fin­it­ions in its policy towards the sub­­co­ntinent.

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(Andreas Hilger lectures at Hamburg and Heidelberg Universities. He has published extensively on Soviet and German history, the Cold War and on the history of Indo-Soviet relations.)