US trumps China in the Indo-Pacific, Sri Lanka pays the price

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Welcoming US Secretary of State John Kerry at the Foreign Ministry last week, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera said “today is just the beginning of a very, very special relationship between Sri Lanka and the United States.” What does this mean? Surely it does not simply refer to the fact that the US’s top diplomat was visiting after ten years. Those in government circles who are reacting to this event as if it’s the best thing since sliced bread, need to be reminded perhaps that there is no free lunch. There will be a price to pay, and the foreign minister is signalling that he’s more than ready to oblige.

Lavishing praise on the UNP-led government’s policy orientation, Kerry in his speech to politicians and civil society representatives at the Hotel Taj Samudra flagged the importance of the Indian Ocean as the ‘world’s most important commercial highway.’ He said “…with its strategic location near deep-water ports in India and Myanmar, Sri Lanka could serve as the fulcrum of a modern and dynamic Indo-Pacific region.” He said the US saw its role ‘partly as a leader:’ “The United States is already providing leadership on maritime security in the India Ocean in association with close friends and allies across the region …”

Challenging China
The role spelt out by the US directly challenges that of China, which, under President Xi Jinping has been actively promoting the concept of the ’21st Century Maritime Silk Road.’ Xi’s maritime diplomacy seeks to restore connectivity in the Asian region by reviving the trade routes and maritime culture associated with the historic Silk Road, which linked China to Africa to the Mediterranean in ancient times. Sri Lanka’s previous government had pledged support to the Silk Road initiative.

Kerry in his Colombo speech went on to refer to maritime security issues of piracy, drug trafficking and disaster/humanitarian relief. In these areas too, China has been playing an increasingly active role on the world stage. We may recall that it was China that evacuated the Sri Lankans stranded in war-torn Yemen recently. When a Chinese submarine docked in Colombo port causing controversy, the Chinese embassy in Colombo went to great lengths to dispel suspicions and explain that its mission related to anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden.

Kerry spoke of the US “promoting the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor to connect South Asia to Southeast Asia and to spur sustainable growth in both regions.” Clearly there is a bid on the part of the US to displace China’s attempted leadership role in the region and in establishing regional connectivity. When Kerry informed his audience that the US and Sri Lanka were ‘working together to oppose the use of intimidation or force to assert territorial or maritime claim by anyone,’ here again the reference was to China. The Asian giant is accused of intimidating its smaller neighbours in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Superpower in the equation
Responding to the solitary question permitted to a local journalist at the press conference following the talk (on why his visit may not be seen as ‘interference in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs’) Kerry asserted that “the United States is not here to ask Sri Lanka to align with anyone, to refuse to have any other relationship…” He pointed out he is here at the invitation of the president, prime minister and foreign minister. In other words, the Government has willingly allowed the superpower into the equation.

It’s worth noting that when Kerry asked President Sirisena about Sri Lanka’s relations with China and India, the President had replied that Sri Lanka ‘strictly followed a nonaligned foreign policy’ and that his government ‘would not allow the relations with one country to affect the relations with another country in any manner.’ India is the closest neighbour with whom there was a special relationship, and China was a development partner that had made heavy investments in Sri Lanka, the president had noted.

Do these remarks point to some dislocation between the President’s and foreign minister’s perspectives on Sri Lanka’s foreign relations? The disruption of the 16th session of the UN Working Group on the Right to Development two weeks ago in Geneva was because Sri Lanka’s foreign ministry reportedly blocked the re-appointment of the chairperson-rapporteur, Tamara Kunanayakam, the nominee of the Non Aligned Movement for the past three years. The move discredited Sri Lanka’s status within the NAM when even the EU and US had been ready to support Kunanayakam. Another line of speculation, according to sources familiar with the issue, is that there was US pressure on NAM’s chair, Iran, to disrupt the Working Group, with some help from Sri Lanka. Iran is on the verge of reaching a deal with major powers over its nuclear programme, and desperately needs to have crippling US sanctions lifted.

Re-branding the image
Samaraweera in his recent speeches has sought to classify Sri Lanka as an ‘Indian Ocean country’ rather than a ‘South Asian country,’ on the basis that this re-profiling would help attract FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). It seems a strange argument considering that Sri Lanka’s biggest investor has been China. Western states, in fact, do not have the kind of money China has, to invest in infrastructure etc., as China has done. Does Samaraweera’s attempt to de-link the country from its South Asian identity point to a desire to re-position it, to suit US maritime objectives in the region? Under the US ‘Pivot to Asia’ the US’s strategic focus has shifted to the Indo-Pacific, where it hopes to locate 60% of its naval assets by the year 2020. This too relates to countering the rise of China.

While Samaraweera is busy re-branding the country’s image to suit US strategic goals, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe seems to be intent on redefining Sri Lanka’s military. In a ‘letter’ dated 07.05.15 addressed to Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, copied to the three service chiefs, he advises the CDS of Kerry’s proposed new role for Sri Lanka’s military in protecting Indian Ocean sea lanes and participating in UN peacekeeping missions. Wickremesinghe asserts that Kerry’s view of the military’s role is endorsed by the Government. Two questions arise. Is there agreement among all sections of the ‘national government’ on this redefinition of the military? And is the PM with this patronising gesture arrogating to himself the role of the President, who is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?

Subtle shift
Sri Lanka will not just swap China for the US as its ‘very, very special’ partner. Kerry told the press that his discussions had ‘a particular focus on the Government’s reform and reconciliation agenda.’ The most significant development in this area since the new Government took over is that there has been a concession to ‘working with’ the UN in the matter of setting up a domestic mechanism for the investigation of alleged war crimes. There has been a subtle shift away from the domestic mechanism strictly under Sri Lanka’s jurisdiction, which was promised in the run up to the election and immediately after, to a ‘joint mechanism’ of sorts. The shift is evident in the language used by both Samaraweera and the western governments he seeks to appease (mainly the US).

For example, in his letter to UN Human Rights Chief Zeid al Hussain in February seeking postponement of the OHCHR report on Sri Lanka, Samaraweera said, “The government looks forward to working with you and your office to develop this mechanism and obtain technical assistance.” The US Secretary of State in Colombo expressed the hope that the Government “will continue to cooperate with the UN” in setting up a domestic investigation that meets international standards. Is this sacrifice of sovereignty part of the price agreed upon in return for a deferral of the OHCHR report?

“… Everything that we are talking about, we are offering, not demanding. Everything that we have suggested is exactly that – a suggestion,” Kerry told reporters. With the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the country in the form of the OHCHR war crimes report to be released in September – in a game played with loaded dice – does this sound like one of those ‘offers you can’t refuse?’

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India and Asian Leadership

Jayshree Borah 

Sixty years ago, delegates from 29 Asian and African countries gathered in Bandung, Indonesia for a conference to decide their own futures and destinies, free of the yoke of colonialism. The aspiration of building an “intermediate camp” of national independence and neutralism to counter the “imperialist camp” of the United States and the “socialist camp” of the Soviet Union was also very much part of the motive behind the conference.
However, the tone for that 1955 conference on Afro-Asian solidarity was actually set by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru almost a decade earlier. Nehru’s enthusiasm for pan-Asian cooperation found its expression in the Asian Relations Conference, convened in New Delhi in March and April 1947. This earlier conference had special significance as it created an Asian Relations Organization in New Delhi and made Nehru its president.
Nehru also recognized at that 1947 conference that Asia had a certain responsibility for the people of Africa as well. Afro-Asian cooperation was needed for the creation of a peaceful international order. Nehru’s belief in Afro-Asian cooperation later fed into the Bandung Conference of 1955. Nehru’s India was at the forefront of the conference, while China was a newly liberated country yet to be recognized by most of the countries of the world. It was Nehru who took the initiative to introduce India’s neighbor to the world, inviting Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to the conference, despite resistance from other founding members of the conference.
Sir John Kotelawala, president of Ceylon, as Sri Lanka was then known, decided he would not follow Zhou’s speech in the subsequent discussions. This was obviously humiliating for China and for Zhou Enlai, who was attending his first international conference. Still, Nehru tried his best to defend Zhou in front of the world. With Nehru’s help, Zhou remained calm and showed no rancor towards Kotelawala. That restraint made a deep impression on the other members of the conference. Zhou’s courtesy, moderation, and reasonableness throughout the conference earned him a moniker: the “Bandung Gentleman.”
Cut to the present, and it was China who took the lead in the conference held at Jakarta and Bandung late last month, with President Xi Jinping in attendance; Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was absent. The Indian government’s lethargic response towards the conference was evident, as neither External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj nor Minister of State (External Affairs) V K Singh acknowledged Nehru in their speeches, reflecting efforts by the Indian government to delink the former prime minister from India’s past achievements. In contrast, Chinese President Xi Jinping recognized the role of Zhou Enlai. In his speech, Xi said that sixty years ago Asian and African leaders gathered to oppose colonialism and neocolonialism, with Zhou advocating “peaceful coexistence” and “seeking common ground while shelving differences.”
Although Modi visited four small Afro-Asian countries last month, the Indian government’s overall presence at regional forums is weak in comparison to China’s. Just before the Bandung Conference 2015, the 54th Annual Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) was held in Beijing, where the Chinese Premier Le Keqiang delivered the keynote address. Even though AALCO is headquartered in New Delhi, surprisingly no high-level government official participated. The Indian government’s continuous absence from other Asian forums such as the Boao Forum for Asia held in Hainan, China in March has also been noted. Which of course begs the question: What is India’s interest in regional affairs? New Delhi has to understand that bilateral visits only will not given India an influential position in Asia.
When Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was introduced to the audience of Afro-Asian countries during the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Chinese premier seized the moment and took the conference as a platform to commence friendly relations with neighboring Asian countries. The conference was a huge success and Zhou became the national face of Chinese foreign policy. His deftness triggered a rapid expansion of diplomatic and economic relations with a number of Asian and African countries. In less than three years from Bandung, China had established relations with Nepal, Egypt, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Iraq.
Nehru’s India meanwhile confronted a troubled neighborhood in the years between the periods of 1957 to 1964. Nehru, the voice of Asian cooperation, had to tackle a dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. He also had to confront Zhou himself over Tibet and Aksai Chin, which finally led to the border war of 1962. India faced strains with other Asian countries, such as Nepal; the efforts of the Nepalese government to have the Soviets set up an embassy in Kathmandu suggested a desire to loosen ties with India, and to develop close bonds with other countries, including China.
Today, Beijing is cementing its ties with developing countries. At the Asian-African Summit in Indonesia it outlined a vision that at least rhetorically supports peace and unity. On the sidelines of the summit, Xi Jinping met with Japanese President Shinzo Abe. Although the significance of the meeting has been questioned by the international media and even though there is no synchronization between the Chinese and Japanese approaches to the unity and solidarity of Afro-Asian countries, the fact is that the leaders of China and Japan were talking for only the second time since Abe took his office. The meeting shows the willingness of both sides to repair a relationship damaged by territorial disputes and a bitter wartime legacy.
On the other hand, the summit in Jakarta became a platform for resentment between India and Pakistan, after Islamabad’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Adviser brought up the Kashmir issue. Indian Representative, Secretary (East), Anil Wadhwa refuted Sartaj Aziz’s remark on Kashmir and said that it was “most unfortunate” that an international forum was used to “make tendentious remarks about J&K, which is an integral part of India.”
As at Bandung 60 years ago, the rhetoric about creating a new Asia-centric world order was a catchphrase of Bandung 2015. However, the difference is that 60 years ago India was at the forefront of efforts to build that world order and now that role is very much being played by China. Nehru’s vision of India as a torchbearer of Asia has long been discarded. Although, India’s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj called for the reform of Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and promised to build a trade route through the Indian Ocean, China is actually way ahead in creating a new economic order with Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” project. Most of the African and Asian countries that attended the summit are already closely linked to China on the economic front, through the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, international trade and infrastructure projects. China proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which appears designed to serve as a substitute for the Bretton Woods institutions. At the end of the summit, participating countries also welcomed Xi’s initiative to provide 100,000 training positions to citizens of developing Asian and African countries over a five-year period, and to hold annual gatherings in China for youths from Asia and Africa.
It is evident that the construction of a China-centric Asian order has gained prominence and traction at the Bandung 2015 conference, with most Afro-Asian countries now appearing to believe that the One Belt, One Road initiative illustrates Chinese commitment to assisting other developing countries in sharing the fruits of its rise.

Why Modi should forge ahead on China despite flak

China has become too important a nation for India to brush aside. Modi is doing the right thing by ignoring domestic criticism and developing a robust but pragmatic engagement with it.



Raj Chengappa 


With the Opposition taking wisecracks about his frequent trips abroad, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his team appear to have gone on the defensive. Especially with Modi all set to fly on another round of foreign visits — this time to China, South Korea and Mongolia between May 14 and 19. Team Modi need not be. As Modi completes a year in the saddle later this month, if there is one area that he has done well in, it is foreign policy. Even BJP leader Arun Shourie, who in an interview to Karan Thapar last week castigated Modi for his lack of clarity on the economy, gave the Prime Minister high marks for the focus and energy that he has brought to India’s foreign policy.

In all his trips abroad and interactions with world leaders so far, whether it be the US, Japan, France, Australia and a host of other countries, Modi’s primary objective has been boosting trade and inviting foreign investments. The hard focus on the economy has had a positive impact with many countries, including the US, doing a rethink on India as an investment destination. The outcome of Modi’s foreign peregrinations though would take a while to register. It has not helped that his government has had a tough time pushing the economic reforms agenda, including amending the controversial Land Acquisition Act that had stifled industrial investment.

What Modi has been careful not to do is to play a zero sum game while conducting foreign relations. So, while bringing India closer to Japan than ever before and re-energising Indo-US relations, he wisely chose not to do it at the cost of antagonising China. When he took over as Prime Minister, Modi seemed to be an unabashed admirer of China, frequently citing how Chinese leaders had wooed and feted him when he was the Gujarat Chief Minister. He went out of the way to greet Chinese President Xi Jinping on his first official visit to India last September, including hosting a lavish reception for him in Gujarat. But Modi got his first lesson of China’s duality (some call it duplicity) when there was a major border violation by Chinese troops in Ladakh even while he was posing for photographs with Xi in Ahmedabad.

It was during the visit that Xi talked about rapidly implementing China’s grand economic strategy called “One Belt, One Road”. Through it, China sought to revive trade and cultural links with nations on the original Silk Road, including those in Central Asia, West Asia and Europe, apart from establishing a 21st century Maritime Silk Road belt of nations spanning two oceans — Indian and Pacific. India saw it as a new name for the old Chinese gameplan of developing a string of pearls to contain India’s ambitions. What Xi was doing was clearly asserting China’s emergence as the world’s second most powerful nation, next only to the US. Modi floated a counter through Project Mausam to revive the old trade routes India had between the Middle East and South East Asian nations, which were also heavily dependent on the monsoon. China is now trying to cleverly merge Project Mausam with its Maritime Silk Road plans and in doing so willy-nilly get India on board with its larger gameplan.

When Modi meets Xi later this week, he would be far more prudent and calculating about what he can achieve on his first visit to China as Prime Minister. By reigniting relations with the US, Japan and Australia, Modi has ensured that China would view him with respect and wariness. But, by engaging with China, he is reassuring them that his intentions are far from being confrontationist. So while there would be no breakthrough on settling the border dispute, what Modi could push for is a series of Confidence Building Measures that would ensure that border intrusions and the tensions that result from it would be minimised.

Modi should come down hard on the negative trade balance between the two countries. While the total trade between the two countries is currently around $70 billion, Indian exports account for barely $12 billion of that and instead, in recent years, it has become a net importer of Chinese goods. Modi, therefore, must insist that Xi gets China to lower its trade barriers, particularly in the pharmaceutical and information technology sectors, so that Indian companies can push their products and boost exports. He should also tell Xi to act more swiftly on the promise he made on his visit last September for China to invest a total of $20 billion in the next five years to boost manufacturing in India. Apart from these, Modi should use the opportunity to discuss important global issues such as climate change and Afghanistan. China has become too important a nation for India to brush aside. Modi is doing the right thing by ignoring domestic criticism and developing a robust but pragmatic engagement with it.

The Unfulfilled Potential of India-Indonesia Relations

Despite enormous promise, the bilateral relationship remains remarkably quiescent.

Tridivesh Singh Maini is a Senior Research Associate with The Jindal School of International Affairs, Sonepat, India. The views here are his own.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will soon be completing his first full year in office. While he has his critics, there tends to be broad agreement that Modi has done a robust job in the sphere of foreign policy. Modi’s approach has focused on economics, soft power, connectivity, and maritime security. Modi has been deft at using what Joseph Nye has dubbed “smart power” – the right blend of soft power and hard power.

The government’s policy towards Southeast Asia – previously called “Look East” and now renamed “Act East” has sought to be comprehensive. Some clear instances of this can be found in relations with Myanmar. Not only is India focusing on enhancing land connectivity, with an eye to boosting the level of bilateral trade, but it is also keen to boost connectivity through the sea as well, for instance with the start of a bi-weekly steamer service connecting Chennai with Yangon.

While the active outreach to Myanmar is welcome, given its strong historical and cultural links, another country that warrants more Indian attention is Indonesia. Now is an appropriate time to re-examine the relationship, given that only recently a conference was held at Bandung to mark the 60th anniversary of the first African-Asian meeting, where the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno were amongst the leading lights. This conference led eventually to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has remained one of the cornerstones of India’s foreign policy.

Of course, much has changed since then, with India making some especially sharp deviations in the post-1991 era, the most marked one being improved ties with the U.S. and a changed approach to the Middle East. Still, there is broad consensus within India in favor of positive ties with Indonesia, and with Southeast Asia more generally.

Modi’s predecessor as prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who himself made a noteworthy contribution to strengthening economic ties with Southeast Asia, visited Indonesia in October 2013. Singh had previously attended the golden jubilee of the Asian-African Conference in 2005, as well as the 9th ASEAN-India Summit and 6th East Asian Summit in 2011. India and Indonesia thus had the opportunity to discuss a host of bilateral issues, strategic and economic, along with matters of global relevance.

Economic Context

Looking at the economic context, like India, Indonesia is also an emerging market with immense potential. In fact Jim O Neill former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and noted for coining the term BRICS, has recently come up with a new acronym, MINT, which includes Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey.

Like India, Indonesia has a rising middle class, which the Asian Development Bank puts at nearly 146 million. (In contrast, McKinsey estimates it to be 45 million.) In a 2012 report, Mckinsey suggests that by 2030, Indonesia could be the world’s 7th largest economy, rising from its current rank of 16th. India’s middle class is meanwhile thought to number between 200-300 million. According to International Monetary Fund and World Bank estimates, India is also set to overtake China in 2016 as the worlds fastest growing economy.

As of 2013, India-Indonesia trade was estimated to be worth around $20 billion, with Indonesia ranked as India’s second-largest trade partner within ASEAN. Indian companies have made investments in areas like infrastructure, mining, banking, and power, with the chemicals industry enjoying particularly stong links.

Historical Links

But India and Indonesia are bound by more than just economic factors; they share strong historical ties that include the trade and maritime links between Kalinga (the current day Odisha) and Indonesia (Java, Sumatra, Bali, and Borneo). The Bali Yatra festival is held each November in the city of Cuttack to commemorate these links. Although Indonesia is an Islamic country, the Hindu influence is evident in the popularity of the famous epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the men who lead India and Indonesia, both elected in 2014, have some similarities in their political backgrounds. True, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has seen his domestic popularity decline much faster and to a far greater degree than Modi’s has. Moreover, their approaches to foreign policy have differed. To date, Modi and Widodo have met only once, in Naypyidaw in November 2014 on the sidelines of the 25th ASEAN Summit.

Still, Indonesia should be a priority for Modi from an economic, strategic and cultural perspective. One area that needs to be strengthened is connectivity; there are no direct flights between the two countries, despite the strong business links and the tourism potential.

Second, India should set up more centers for India studies in universities in Indonesia. India is in fact hoping to set up an “India corner” at various universities, and Udayana University was presented with works by renowned Indian novelists as well as books on areas like governance and health care by India’s ambassador in 2013. While the Indian government already grants scholarships to Indonesian students, setting up research centers would be an important step in increasing awareness not just about the historical ties, but the significance of strengthening the current relationship.

Third, many state governments have been reaching out to Malaysia and Singapore. States such as Odisha, which share strong historical ties with Indonesia, should contribute to furthering the bilateral relationship.

India has moved from idealism to pragmatism in a number of its relationships. In the case of Indonesia, it has been heavily dependent upon historical ties, and in spite of the numerous synergies the relationship is far from fulfilling its potential. In other important relationships, Modi has sought to balance historical links with current and future interests. He should do the same with Indonesia.

Tridivesh Singh Maini is a Senior Research Associate with The Jindal School of International Affairs, Sonepat, India. The views here are his own.

Fumbling With Friends

by Munir Akram- The writer is former ambassador of Pakistan 

Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies have been damaged significantly by Islamabad’s refusal to join the Arab coalition formed to push back the Iran-linked Houthis in Yemen. The Saudis were ‘jolted’ by Pakistan’s position and the manner in which it was reached.

For several decades, Pakistani leaders have professed bonds of brotherhood and solidarity with the Saudis and other Gulf states. They have vowed eloquently to defend Islam’s holy places. They have treated the Gulf’s rulers with extraordinary deference. Many Pakistani political leaders are personally and politically indebted to these rulers.

At the state level, Pakistan has frequently relied on the financial largesse of the Gulf states, especially during times of crisis. Millions of Pakistanis work and live in these states, annually remitting close to $10 billion back home. The Pakistan armed forces have provided extensive security support and training to these countries. There was even a widely held assumption that Pakistan has extended a ‘nuclear umbrella’ to Saudi Arabia in case it faced an existential threat.

Read: Parliament insists on neutrality

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The erosion of Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia will weaken, not enhance, our leverage with Iran.

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The fumbling manner in which Pakistan’s response was evolved added insult to Saudi injury: endless and inconclusive cabinet meetings; the defence minister’s public announcement upon return from consultations in Riyadh that the Saudis had asked for “ground, air and naval forces”; the reference of the request to parliament, designed to provide a thinly disguised alibi for the government’s negative response, subjecting the Saudis to unprecedented and gratuitous public criticism in the process; Islamabad’s reception of the Iranian foreign minister while the parliamentary debate was under way, creating an impression that Pakistan’s negative response was the result of Iranian intervention; the offer to ‘mediate’ between Saudi Arabia and Iran after such a maladroit performance was considered ‘laughable’.

Though seething, the Saudi leadership preserved its characteristic calm, leaving it to the UAE deputy foreign minister to express the disappointment and anger of Pakistan’s ‘closest’ Arab friends. While the Pakistan Foreign Office discreetly refrained from responding, the interior minister did so, escalating the spat further.

According to Pakistani officials, the Saudis have ‘understood’ Pakistan’s position following the hastily arranged visit of the prime minister, accompanied by the army chief, to Riyadh. This seems highly unlikely. Politeness is often mistaken for acquiescence. A well-placed Saudi official believes that the damage to the relationship will be ‘long-lasting’ and take considerable time and effort to repair.

It is unlikely that the Saudis and other GCC states will retaliate by deporting Pakistani workers. But it could influence their future recruitment policies. Financial support and concessional oil supplies may not be forthcoming in future. Strategically, the Saudis and their allies may move closer to India.

This diplomatic fiasco could have been avoided if Pakistan had closely analysed the evolving strategic scenario in the Gulf and anticipated the Saudi request. The ill-considered US military interventions of the last decade have enabled Iran to enlarge its influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and, now, Yemen, virtually encircling Saudi Arabia. This has also contributed to widening the region’s sectarian fault lines.

Iran’s role will enlarge further once it concludes its nuclear deal with the major powers and frees itself of sanctions. Indeed, it may be able to play this larger role in collaboration with the US, whose first priority now is to battle the Islamic State, Al Qaeda and other Sunni ‘terrorist’ organisations, rather than contain Iran.

The advance of the Iran-backed Shia Houthis in Yemen and ouster of its elected president — made possible by US-Saudi mismanagement of former president Saleh — was the straw that broke the back of Saudi patience. The Saudis formed the Arab coalition to accumulate military capability that would compensate for the absence of US security support. They expected two countries in particular to fill the military gap: Egypt and Pakistan. The Egyptians immediately declared their support although the precise nature of their military contribution to the coalition remains uncertain. The Saudi expectation of Pakistan was even higher, given the battle experience of the Pakistan Army and the long tradition of military cooperation between the two countries.

Pakistan’s reluctance to support the coalition was reportedly due to its concern about Iran’s reaction. Pakistan’s relations with Iran are vital for several reasons: controlling insurgencies on both sides of the Balochistan border; stabilisation of Afghanistan; the sentiments of Pakistan’s Shia minority; prospects of mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

But several factors need to be considered in this context: one, Yemen is vital for Saudi security; it is a distant power play for Iran; two, international legality is on the Saudi side. It is defending an elected president. Its objectives, if not its tactics, have been endorsed by the UN Security Council; three, Pakistan’s support for the coalition could have been calibrated to conform to international legality, for instance, by stationing troops defensively on the Saudi side of the border; providing military advisers; deploying naval vessels to implement the UN embargo against the Houthis.

In any event, Pakistan-Iran relations are complex and multi-dimensional. At present, Iran’s relationship with India is closer than its ties to Pakistan. It is India’s largest oil supplier and a huge market for Indian goods, despite sanctions. India and Iran are building a port at Chabahar and a road link to Afghanistan and Central Asia that is designed to circumvent Pakistan. And, Iran continues to nurture its ‘friends’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The erosion of Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC will weaken, not enhance, Pakistan’s leverage with Iran. Equally, the erosion of Saudi influence in the Gulf and the Levant will skew the regional power balance further towards Tehran. Pakistan is an integral part of this power balance. It cannot sit out the game. It must play an active role to promote outcomes that are consistent with its national interest and international law and which do not allow any state to dominate the region.

To this end, it should engage in open-ended consultations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to identify possible areas for strategic cooperation not only in Yemen but across the region. Simultaneously, Pakistan should also engage Iran, not only on bilateral issues and Afghanistan, but to find common ground for cooperative solutions to the sectarian conflicts that rage today across the Gulf and the Levant.

The danger behind Pakistan"s new swagger

International analysts have been observing Pakistan closely to ascertain its internal security situation and assess the feasibility of the predicted implosion which could bring a catastrophic fallout in the subcontinent. In the urge to focus on this situation, many may have overlooked the positives that have flowed Pakistan"s way in the last few months. In the wake of the Peshawar terrorist attack on the army school, Pakistan"s already weak civil society, military and political leadership appeared shaken and there were immediate steps undertaken towards retribution against the so-called bad jihadi elements. Even with its failing confidence Pakistan appears to have ridden out the storm and a new swagger to its national confidence seems increasingly evident. This is clear from the body language displayed on television, the utterances of common Pakistanis as well as the handling of its diplomacy. How has this happened and what effect is this likely to have on bilateral relations with India? The first of the reasons for Pakistan"s surge in confidence is the three way diplomatic success that it has achieved. From Russia, a nation with which Pakistan could never establish a strong political relationship, there came a helicopter deal for Mi-35 attack helicopters opening up a channel for arms supply which has never existed in seventy years. From the US comes one billion dollar support with equipment for its counter insurgency operations (dual use of this for conventional operations is not ruled out) on the western border with Afghanistan. This is a boon because Pakistan has hardly demonstrated its full intent of comprehensively targeting all terrorists and continues its selective focus while supporting Punjab-based jihadis linked to Hafiz Sayeed and his ilk. The paradox is that the $10 million bounty on Sayeed"s head remains live and Pakistan without a step towards enabling that receives the reward of a billion dollars" worth of weaponry. The high profile visit of China"s President Xi Jinping, earlier postponed due to the agitation in Islamabad, has added a couple of inches to Pakistan"s chest, notwithstanding the poor record of implementation of deals and promises made by China. The Sino-Pakistan relationship, often described as "all weather" and sometimes as "sweeter than honey and stronger than steel," is a source of great politico-strategic strength for Pakistan. Besides the $46 billion infrastructure deal under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, programme, China had earlier agreed to provide eight submarines; a total of fifty other agreements in agriculture, education and energy were signed. Xi"s aircraft was escorted through Pakistan"s airspace by eight JF-17 Thunder jets which Pakistan built with Chinese help. The visit had all the optics right to send home the message that the Sino-Pakistan relationship was an enduring and mutually beneficial one. The CPEC, spoken for long and on which work in patches was already ongoing, will provide China access to the Indian Ocean through its fragile western region which is crying for economic development and where some of China"s richest mineral deposits exist. It will also facilitate an adjunct infrastructure to exploit China"s stakes in Afghanistan"s rich and unexploited mineral belt. The detail is irrelevant because it is suffice to assume that Pakistan"s survival as a nation State cannot ever have been more important for China. On the Afghanistan front Pakistan could not have it better. The change of presidency brought Ashraf Ghani to power as against the expected Abdullah Abdullah who as CEO now plays a lesser role. Ghani"s perception that without Pakistan there could be no peace in Afghanistan may well be correct, but taking it to the other extreme by treating India as of little significance probably gives Pakistan its required ego boost, notwithstanding his just completed visit to New Delhi. New Regional & National History (General) Books Best Selling Humanities (General) Books For You Readers Choice - Politics & Government (General) Books Ashraf Ghani visited New Delhi a full seven months after his appointment and after he has had his fill of visits to Pakistan, including to the Pakistan army"s GHQ to register the Pakistan army"s role. Enough reasons for Pakistan"s upgraded confidence. The last of the virtual diplomatic coups that Pakistan has pulled off is the red signal it showed its greatest benefactor, Saudi Arabia. In the face of its none too strong economy denying military support to the Saudi-led alliance of Arab nations against the Houthi rebels in Yemen is nothing short of a major surprise. For once Pakistan has displayed its ability to resist looking towards the Arab world although the consequences of this it will have to bear. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief General Raheel Sharif did proceeded to Riyadh to offer support and explanations, but Pakistan"s diplomatic stature has probably risen in the eyes of the international community, giving it further confidence. Will the new swagger impact India-Pakistan relations and have an effect on Prime Minister Narendra Modi"s upcoming visit to China? This must be seen in the light of India"s earlier decision to send its new foreign secretary to Islamabad as a part of a SAARC round robin of visits. Perhaps this too added to Pakistan"s confidence towards its ability to weather India"s diplomatic pressure. Some strategists may not be in agreement with Mr Modi"s policy of reversing India"s decision so quickly after it had called off foreign secretary talks. I tend to believe that Mr Modi was right for the simple reason that his decision added unpredictability to India"s diplomatic discourse and recognised the emerging dynamics of the region where perhaps India could end up more isolated. Pragmatic analysis shows that Pakistan"s geo-strategic location is its greatest asset. A key player in the New Great Game in Central Asia and peripheral areas, Pakistan is internationally crucial for three aspects of any modern strategic relationships -- accessibility to the ocean, energy conduits and ideology. Being the realist that our prime minister is, he is bound to appreciate this. It is better to be engaged, even peripherally, than find yourself outside the ambit of international dynamics which are hurtling at speeds faster than can be responded to. Mr Modi has lost nothing by making this engagement and can progressively decrease or increase his outreach. With China it will need to be strongly registered that the infrastructure built in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir infringes upon what is considered as our territory.This is the second time such liberty is being taken with territories which are Indian but under Pakistani and Chinese control, the last being the illegal ceding of over 5,000 square km to China by Pakistan. The successful Chinese president"s visit to Pakistan should not put our prime minister"s visit to China in any jeopardy because the Sino-Indian economic relationship is far too significant.However, we need to be clear that Pakistan is not going to allow access to India to take benefit of the emerging New Silk Route connecting China with Europe. There is no option but to aggressively pursue the Chahbahar route for access to Central Asia and perhaps band wagon on the New Silk Route too. For this, we need Iran more than ever before.Lastly, Pakistan may feel emboldened to give an upswing to the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, having secured a better international consensus on its own strategic importance. The situation in J&K is undergoing progressive change with terrorism at a low ebb. Recent events such as the raising of Pakistani flags by separatists is an attempt to win some psychological space and more of this can be expected as we go into the summer. Pakistan should remain warned that pushing India on this issue will be dangerous. In fact our diplomacy must now sufficiently sensitise the international community on the dangers of a resurgent Pakistan and any of its actions targeting J&K.

Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) commanded India"s strategic Srinagar-based 15 Corps. He is associated with two strategic think tanks - the Vivekanand International Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group.

A post-war Indian perspective-Part I ‘The ground situation in Sri Lanka is more favorable today than it ever was for democratic decentralization’

Prof. Ashwani K. Sharma strongly recommends democratic decentralization in post-war Sri Lanka. Sharma, now with the Centre for Contemporary Indian Studies (CCIS), at the Colombo University, believes that the ground situation in Sri Lanka was more favorable today than it ever was. The Indian - funded CCIS came into being, in 2012, following an agreement between the University of Colombo and the High Commission of India in Colombo.

Prof Sharma said: "The long civil-war has ended and the process of reconciliation and reconstruction has begun. It is an appropriate time for the Sri Lankan government to devolve more financial and other powers to the provinces. It would make a positive contribution to the reconciliation and development process."

The visiting academician discussed a range of contentious issues in an interview with The Island recently. The following is the excerpts of the interview.

(Q) Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, recently declared that Sri Lanka couldn’t have eradicated the LTTE without India’s support. The Sri Lankan Army brought the war to a successful conclusion, in May, 2009. In an exclusive with Hahiharan, of Tamil Nadu’s Thanthi TV, Wickremesinghe emphasized that India threw its weight behind the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa government, during Eelam War IV, to ensure the LTTE’s defeat. When the interviewer pointed out that India had categorically denied helping the Rajapaksa government, to defeat the LTTE, a smiling Premier Wickremesinghe said: "amnesia is, you know, very common among politicians."

Both India and Sri Lanka cannot ignore very serious accusation made by former President Rajapaksa that India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) worked closely with the US and British intelligence services to engineer his defeat at the Jan. 8, 2015, presidential poll. Rajapaksa’s accusation should be examined in the backdrop of his extremely close relationship with Beijing. Would you believe New Delhi would find it much easier to communicate with Colombo in the wake of Rajapaksa’s defeat?

(A) It was for the first time that all the Presidents/Prime Ministers of all the SAARC countries were invited to the swearing-in ceremony of the Prime Minister of a new regime in India. President Rajapaksa also attended the ceremony. I do not think that there has been any issue of communication between India and Sri Lanka either in the previous regime or the new regime. This goodwill gesture by the new Indian regime is also reflective of its commitment to close cooperation with its neighbors.

(Q) Indian Premier, Narendra Modi, during his two -day official visit here, reiterated India’s call for implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, as prescribed by the Congress, nearly 30 years ago. Modi urged Sri Lanka to go beyond the 13th Amendment to ensure peaceful resolution of the conflict. Would it be to the advantage of Premier Modi/India to pursue the failed Congress strategy in Sri Lanka? Would you you believe in the possibility of negotiating a brand new agreement/formula to address Sri Lanka’s national issue?

(A) Liberal democracy in pluralist societies is undergoing changes and throwing up new challenges all across the world. Scotland in the UK and Quebec in Canada are examples from the western world. In South Asia, issue of identity politics is acquiring increasing salience, and regions of nation-state are demanding more autonomy and freedom in running their own affairs. In India, for example, states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh were bifurcated because of identity (regional identity) issue. The most recent example of bifurcation of the state of Andhra Pradesh is illustrative of the issues involved. One part of the state dominated the other part: socially, politically and economically. Separate statehood had been a long standing demand of Telengana region in Andhra Pradesh. It was rightly granted statehood and now it has an identity of its own, in the country and in national politics. It also hopes to bring in good governance and faster growth and development than before.

A very significant development in India this year has been that states are given more financial autonomy. This move of the central government has a strong rational basis. First, the states in India have over the years performed better than the central government in managing their finances: states have had less deficit in their budget than the central government. Second, states ought to be given more autonomy in pursuing their own development priorities rather than the Centre imposing it on them. This move towards democratic decentralization will strengthen democracy and would also take care of identity issue.

The crux of the 13th Amendment is devolution of power to the regions/provinces in Sri Lanka. It is part of democratic decentralization in a pluralist society with liberal democracy. Governance through democratic decentralization is more relevant in the contemporary world than it ever was. It would not only contribute to good governance but also enable the regions/provinces to prioritize their social, economic, and cultural development. Importantly, it would also address the issue of identity. In sum, acceptance of diversity, pluralism, multiculturalism, and political culture of democratic decentralization is the norm for contemporary liberal democracies.

(Q) India forced the 13A on the then JRJ government, in accordance with the Indo-Lanka accord of July, 1987. India intervened as the Sri Lankan Army was on the verge of finishing off the LTTE, in the Jaffna peninsula. It was New Delhi’s remedy to an unprecedented security/political crisis caused by the then government of India. No less a person than one-time Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N.Dixit, faulted the then Premier Indira Gandhi for Indian military intervention here (Dixit’s memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy’).Could Modi/India justify its push for 13 A/13A plus ignoring the total change in the ground situation?

(A) As an academic, I would strongly support democratic decentralization. The ground situation in Sri Lanka is more favorable today than it ever was. The long civil-war has ended and the process of reconciliation and reconstruction has begun. It is an appropriate time for Sri Lankan government to devolve more financial and other powers to the provinces. It would make a positive contribution to the reconciliation and development process.

At the national level, the current government is moving towards democratic decentralization. Executive powers so far vested in the President are proposed to be shared between the President and the Prime Minister. A logical step forward in this process of democratic decentralization would be to devolve more powers to the provinces also. And it would be ideal to create an ‘Upper House’/’Senate’ through which provinces can participate in national political decision-making.

(Q) What would be PM Modi’s foreign policy focus? Would his foreign policy focus, too, be dominated by China and Pakistan?

(A) Let me begin with a theoretical perspective that I am currently in the process of developing for analyzing foreign policy focus of any country in an intensely globalizing world; including that of India and China. It will provide a context and make the focus of foreign policy of India more intelligible.

There is a paradigmatic shift in global politics from geopolitics to geo-economics. Geopolitics had been the dominant paradigm since the World War II and continued to be so until the beginning of the new millennium. With the intensification of the processes of globalization in the last decade of the twentieth century and in the new millennium, geo-economics is gaining ascendency over geopolitics. And this development of significance necessitates re-conceptualization of ‘Security’ in general and particularly in South Asia.

The context to the movement from geopolitics to geo-economics is provided by the contemporary phase of globalization, which according to many analysts, began in the early 1960s. The intensification of the processes of globalization in the 1990s and in the new millennium facilitated the paradigmatic shift towards geo-economics. The ending of the cold war provided space, time, focus and environment conducive to this shift in paradigm in global politics.

Geopolitics is both a theoretical approach to understanding international relations as well as method of analyzing foreign policy behavior based on geographical variable such as size of the nation-state, physical location, demography, climate, natural resources and technological advances. The fundamentals of this approach are conditioned by security concerns, relative strength, conflicts, and alliances in international relations. The crucial determinants of this approach are power and how the game of balance of power is played out in international relations. Although the approach does take into account economic variables but only to the extent that it adds to the relative military strength (traditional national defense) and that of self-sufficiency of the nation-state. Thus, economic variables are taken into account but as adjunct to political variables. In other words, economic issues are considered as ‘low politics’.

The concept ‘geoeconomics’, like geopolitics, is both a branch of cognition and the reality it studies. The fundamentals of this approach to the understanding of international relations are conditioned by economic variables such as economic growth, development, trade, investment, natural resources, human and technological resources, and economic dependence. It accords primacy to ‘economic security’ in relation to traditional conceptualization of security exclusively in terms of ‘military security’. Economic security has not displaced military security but has eclipsed it in strategic calculations of foreign policy responses in international relations. As a result, regions with growing economic strength are increasingly becoming salient in foreign policy matrix of nation-states. In sum, economic issues are considered as ‘high politics’.

‘Growth and Development’ and ‘Make in India’ are the twin objectives that India’s foreign policy is currently focusing on. PM Modi’s visits to the growing economic regions of the world substantiates the point I have made. Mutually beneficial economic cooperation, free flow of foreign direct investment into India, and Indian investment in other countries, is the main theme of India’s foreign policy. The response from countries across the world has been overwhelming. However, emphasis on geo-economics does not preclude the importance that India accords to geopolitical and geo-strategic issues in its foreign policy.

China and India are the two fastest growing economies in the world that has 212 countries. China is India’s competitor in world trade. India as well as China understand the paradigm shift in global politics and are therefore becoming healthy competitors in trade in goods, investment, and services. The border dispute between India and China has slid to the back burner. The focus is now on mutual trade and healthy competition in the global economy. Both the countries stand to gain from this approach.

(Q) Could you explain the status of the Indo-Lanka civil nuclear cooperation and whether Sri Lanka will receive some tangible benefits through it?

(A) India-Sri Lanka civil nuclear cooperation focuses on "exchange of knowledge and expertise, sharing of resources, capacity building and training of personnel in peaceful uses of nuclear energy". In addition, India would also provide Sri Lanka with small nuclear reactors. Sri Lanka has preferred India over China and Pakistan for civil nuclear cooperation.

There is a broader context to the issue. There are four pillars of ‘Human Security’: food security, water security, energy security, and environmental security. It is common knowledge that there is a global energy crisis. This crisis is all the more acute in South Asia. All the South Asian states suffer from energy insecurity.

The demand for energy is increasing exponentially in Sri Lanka as well as India. This is because of requirements of economic growth and development. Economic growth leads to higher demand for energy in industrial establishments, commercial establishment, agriculture, health care industry, and households. India as well as Sri Lanka has more than 1/5 of the population below the poverty line. For poverty alleviation and raising the standard of living of the people, it is imperative for both the countries to grow in double digits. And this would require higher and higher levels of uninterrupted supply of energy.

There are three sources of energy supply in Sri Lanka: hydro power (58%), thermal power (40%), and wind, solar, bio-mass, etc. (2%). Hydro power is a clean and renewable source of energy but can vary with the amount of seasonal rain. Higher rain would lead to higher production and a lean season of rain would lead to lower production of power. Thermal power plants use coal, oils, and gas as fuel for generating power. All the fuels for thermal power generation are imported in Sri Lanka. Known reserves of all these fuels in the world are limited and exhaustible. Therefore, the prices of these fuels are expected to keep moving up in the medium and long term. This would create heavy pressure on the balance-of payments of Sri Lanka. As per the 2012-13 official figures, Sri Lanka exports were worth $10 billion and imports worth $19 billion. There is already a huge balance of payment deficit.

Huge amount of investment in Research & Development has taken place in the last forty years across the world in making energy production from solar, wind, and tidal waves commercially/economically viable. There has not been any success so far to register.

The only alternative left for future energy security in Sri Lanka is nuclear energy. India was in a similar situation. India opted for nuclear energy as part of its ‘energy mix’. Sri Lanka should also go in for nuclear energy as part of its energy mix. Here, it needs to be added that if the explorative gas find in wells off the Coast of Mannar Island becomes commercially successful, it will definitely contribute to Sri Lankan energy security.

Nuclear science is also of immense utility in medical science: Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), radiotherapy, nuclear medicine for thyroid treatment are well known uses of nuclear science. Radiation and radioisotopes are used for diagnosis and therapy in medical science. If medical science has to progress in Sri Lanka, then, nuclear science has to be given a boost. And Indo-Sri Lankan civil nuclear cooperation would precisely provide that much needed boost.

In addition, there are innumerable uses of nuclear science in industry and agriculture. Industrial as well as agricultural development requires parallel development in nuclear science.

Retooling country's foreign policy

It is a time of profound transformation in global politics and economy with paradigm changes not only in South Asia but also in Europe, Central Asia and West Asia: 

There is a discernable shift of the economic centre of gravity with rumbles of new alignments in which China and Russia are cooperating in Eurasia through trade and energy connectivity and many new financial institutions and organizations like SCO. 

The "Asian pivot" or "rebalancing" - though primarily focused on the Asia-Pacific - is also generating new dynamics in South Asia. 

The rise of potent non-state actors, like ISIS, has changed the global threat matrix and is beginning to imperil the stability of many states and societies. 

Terrorism, climate change, economic interdependence, regional integration, and a shrinking globe, are all facets of the infinitely complex world that we are destined to grapple with. 

Meanwhile, globalization continues to forge ahead, with all its positive and negative ramifications. 

Keeping in view these far reaching changes, the first important foreign policy objective is to safeguard Pakistan's security and eliminate the growing culture of extremism and violence from society. Starting with a clean-up operations in Karachi initiated in September 2013, the launch of the operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan in June 2014 and finally a 20-point National Action Plan of December 2015 initiated with the active support of all the political parties, constitute decisive initiatives for providing sustained security to people. 

The second important objective is to make economic revival and sustained development the center-piece of our foreign policy. In fact, no country can safeguard its sovereignty and vital national interests without a strong economy. There are several positive indicators to highlight the progress that has been made in the past 18 months. It is expected that economic revival will gather further momentum in the coming years as the energy crisis is resolved. 

The third important priority of a peaceful neighbourhood automatically flows from these two objectives. Significant progress has been made in strengthening Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, China and Iran. 

After Ashraf Ghani took over the Afghan Presidency in September 2014, there has been a steady improvement in Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan. Apart from important agreements for strengthening economic and trade ties, both countries have also agreed not to allow their territory to be used against the other and cooperate in achieving peaceful reconciliation in Afghanistan. The prospects of peace in Afghanistan are now more hopeful. 

Pakistan's relations with China have always been very friendly but in the past 18 months, economic and security cooperation has crossed new thresholds to become "a strategic partnership for common destiny". 

The only disappointment in pursuing this policy of peaceful neighbourhood is India. During Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's visit to New Delhi to participate in Prime Minister Modi's inauguration on 26 May 2014, it was agreed that the two Foreign Secretaries will meet soon to revive the peace process. This meeting was scheduled for 25 August, but a week earlier, India unilaterally cancelled it on the pretext of Pakistan High Commissioner's meeting with two Kashmiri leaders. The cancellation was followed by growing tensions and unprovoked firing across the Line of Control and the Working Boundary. India has also launched a systemic campaign to isolate Pakistan by dwelling on its favourite themes of the past few years and by refusing to acknowledge Pakistan's determined efforts to eliminate terrorism from the region. 

On 13th February, Prime Minister Modi telephoned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and said the Indian Foreign Secretary would visit Pakistan soon. Whether this visit will be a resumption of meaningful dialogue between the two countries remains to be seen. 

Pakistan's bilateral relations with the US are also witnessing a significant improvement. After the crisis ridden relationship of 2011-2012, the official visit of the Prime Minster to Washington in October 2013 put the relations back on a positive trajectory. This was followed by the two rounds of the Strategic Dialogue that were suspended in 2010, the first in Washington on 28 January 2014 and the second in Islamabad on 12-13 January 2015, just a fortnight before President Obama's visit to India. 

The improvement in US-Pakistan relations is based on several important policy changes and initiatives by Pakistan in the past 18 months. These changes and initiative were motivated by Pakistan's own national interests but they also addressed some of the US concerns and priorities. 

First, is the strong commitment to fight terrorism. Second, the remarkable upgrade in Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan has not only helped to create a conducive environment to facilitate a smooth drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan but also improved the prospects for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Third, the comprehensive interactions in 5 Working Groups on the economy, energy, defence, nuclear issues and counter-terrorism have helped broaden and deepen US-Pakistan cooperation in these areas. 

Other initiatives taken, as a part of a more active and result-oriented foreign policy include: 

Launch of several new initiatives to expand energy and trade connectivity with Central Asia and West Asia. The proposed Economic Corridor from Gwadar to Kashgar will be further extended to other Central Asian countries, and apart from expanding CASA-1000 electricity import project, additional projects will be undertaken to import gas from Iran, Turkmenistan and Qatar. 

Deepening engagement with the Russian Federation, as Russia and China cooperate, in SCO and other fora, to integrate Eurasia into the world economy without ideological overtones of the cold war era. 

Building deeper trade and economic linkage with Southeast Asia/ASEAN. 

Reviving closer ties with and seeking new avenues of cooperation with Africa and Latin America. 

Serving Pakistani diaspora and mobilizing their potential to advance our national interests. 

The core elements of our approach would remain constructive engagement, non-interference and advancement of trade, investment and economic cooperation to maximize our diplomatic space and enhance foreign policy options. 

The center piece of this new partnership seems to focus on security and military cooperation based on Defence Technology and Trade Initiative and a framework for US-India Defence Relationship for the next 10 years. 

The second important component was the understanding on the implementation of Civil Nuclear agreement finalized in 2006. While details are still unclear, they have agreed to create an Insurance Pool of Rs 15 billion to cover the liability risk of American nuclear companies. It is too early to predict if these companies would find this insurance pool sufficient to facilitate large scale export of nuclear reactors. 

The two sides also signed a US-India Investment Initiative, and an MoU on cooperation of many high tech items with $2 billion private investment in clean energy. 

The US also offered its support to India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. They also agreed to "work together" on climate change to seek a positive outcome of the Paris Conference by the end of 2015. 

From the US perspective, closer relations with India fit in well with its Asia Pivot policy as it tries to boost India's status as a key regional power and a counter-weight to China. 

While the final outcome of the visit will unfold in due course, Pakistan has already spelled out its initial concerns and expectations about the visit. 

Pakistan's key concern is the paramount importance of strategic stability in South Asia. 

India has embarked on a massive military build-up, through sizeable arm purchases both from Russia and the US. This will inevitably worsen the conventional imbalance. 

In addition, India is also expanding its fissile material production facilities that would boost its weapons programme and is seeking access to advanced technology in missile and related delivery systems. 

These conventional and nuclear imbalances between India and Pakistan are growing at a time when India is accentuating tensions and unprovoked firing across the Line of Control and the Working Boundary. It has also launched a systematic campaign to isolate Pakistan by dwelling on its favourite themes of the past few years and by refusing to acknowledge Pakistan's determined efforts to eliminate terrorism from the region. 

While Pakistan reserves the right to safeguard its national security interests, it expects USA to recognize the importance of strategic stability to allow space and resources to focus on the objectives of economic development and poverty reduction and reduce the possibility of a reinvigorated arms race in the sub-continent. 

We hope that not only USA but also other important members of the international community will also support this objective of regional balance and strategic stability in South Asia. 

Pakistan is an important player on the Western half of Asia, which includes Afghanistan, Iran and the whole Central and West Asia. As one of the few stable and well functioning states in the Muslim world, Pakistan's role in promoting stability and in facilitating connectivity in this important part of Asia, is indispensable and well recognized not only by USA but also by Russia and China. 
Pakistan is an important player on the Western half of Asia.