Wednesday, 6 May 2015

The Arab Battle for U.S. Skies

BAI, United Arab Emirates — Amid the turmoil and tumult of today’s Middle East, the region achieved a quiet milestone in 2014: Dubai International Airport surpassed London Heathrow to become the world’s busiest airport, measured in terms of international passengers. With its faux palm trees, Porsche raffles, and glittering duty-free shops selling everything from Scottish single malts and Havana cigars to Swiss chocolates, gold bars, and local dates, the airport, at times, feels like a 21st-century shrine to consumerist globalization.
But look beyond the duty-free glitter and do some people-watching, and you’ll see one of the most cosmopolitan collections of peoples under a single roof anywhere. A group of salwar kameez-clad Pakistani tribesman with red henna beards and white turbans fawn over the latest iPhone. A Kenyan sports team in tracksuits orders sandwiches at a Subway. A tanned European couple with Louis Vuitton hand luggage flip through magazines. A group of young Iranian women shop for perfume, a gaggle of Chinese and Indians buy gold, and a Balkanish-looking fellow in a black leather jacket and neck tattoo yells into a phone.
In 2014, Forbes magazine noted that Dubai is the most air-connected city on the planet, contributing to its distinction as the seventh “most influential” city in the world. Jad Mouawad of the New York Times points out that this Persian Gulf city-state has emerged as an air superhub, a modern crossroadsconnecting East and West. The rise of Dubai and other Arabian Peninsula air hubs — Abu Dhabi and Doha — have reshaped global commercial aviation. And the Gulf “Big Three” airlines — Emirates in Dubai, Etihad Airways in Abu Dhabi, and Qatar Airways in Doha — have emerged as major global carriers, capable of going toe to toe with the industry’s giants.
Their rise has coincided with the emergence of a new global middle class and an attendant surge in global air travel. Unsurprisingly, the fastest-growing market in air travel comes from emerging economies — places that the Gulf carriers serve well. According to the Airbus’s Global Market Forecast, emerging markets will account for nearly two-thirds of all air travel by 2033.
The three hubs of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha are blessed with fortunate commercial geography: They are a four-hour flight to one-third of the world’s population and an eight-hour flight to two-thirds. 
Any self-respecting McKinsey study would have told these governments to build air hubs and national airlines to exploit their comparative geographic advantage.
Any self-respecting McKinsey study would have told these governments to build air hubs and national airlines to exploit their comparative geographic advantage. And they did.

Request for takeoff
It was inevitable, then, that the Gulf carriers would eventually begin direct flights to the United States in hopes of encouraging Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Australian travelers to use Dubai or Abu Dhabi instead of Frankfurt or London as their stopover hub en route to the United States — and, conversely, bringing U.S. travelers to Doha or Dubai on their way to Delhi, Bangkok, or Sydney. Over the past five years, the Gulf carriers have flooded the zone, with some 252 direct flights a week from their respective hubs to 10 U.S. cities, from Seattle to Chicago to New York. It’s a sound business model: feed the demand of growing traveler needs while hitting the most important market in the world.
Unsurprisingly, Delta, United, and American Airlines — the three largest U.S. carriers — are displeased. The Gulf airlines, after all, are cutting into the U.S. long-haul business, the most lucrative in aviation. Just ask Lufthansa what that looks like: The German carrier has had its market share slashed by nearly a third since 2005, as some 3 million Germans annually opt for the Gulf carriers to take them to Asia. This has been good for German consumers, to be sure. But not for Lufthansa. The same goes for the U.S. Big Three: Increased capacity may be good for the consumer, but not for them. After suffering record losses in 2008, it was their refusal to expand capacity on domestic flights, thus raising their prices, that helped them recover.
Since 2005, U.S. airlines have also been consolidating at a rapid clip: America West with U.S. Airways, Northwest with Delta, Continental with United, AirTran with Southwest, and then, most recently, U.S. Airways with American. The U.S. Airways-American merger prompted a Justice Department antitrust lawsuit. “In recent years, major airlines have, in tandem, raised fares, imposed new and higher fees and reduced service,” the Justice Department noted. Then Attorney General Eric Holder said in an August 2013 statement that “This transaction would result in consumers paying the price — in higher airfares, higher fees and fewer choices.” Ultimately, the merger was approved. Today, as a result of these consolidations, only four carriers handle 80 percent of U.S. airline seat capacity.
The war for airspace
Now, Delta, United, and American are engaged in an orchestrated campaign, suggesting that the Middle Eastern carriers have benefited unfairly from some $40 billion in subsidies from Gulf governments over the past decade. They demand that Washington curtail those carriers’ direct flights into the United States and are taking their complaint directly to the White House via that most time-honored of Washington swords: a white paper detailing their extensive allegations. They have also created a 501(c)(4) organization,Americans for Fair Skies, that is flooding the capital with advertisements, including ads on this very website.
The message of Americans for Fair Skies is simple: The Gulf carriers are operating on an uneven playing field, deriving tremendous benefits from their state ownership, including a slew of alleged subsidies. “This unprecedented level of support allows the Gulf airlines to operate not as businesses, as U.S. airlines do, but as arms of their well-heeled predatory governments,” the organization states on its website.
The Gulf carriers generally retort that consumers enjoy their award-winning premium service and benefit from their global connectivity all across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The independent Skytrax airline ratings agency seems to agree: The Gulf Big Three made it to the top 10 list at the agency’s prestigious 2014 World Airline Awards, while the U.S. Big Three barely cracked the top 50: Delta came in at 49, United at 53, and American at 89.
“Stop complaining,” says Danny Sebright, president of the U.S.-UAE Business Council, to U.S. carriers, and “start competing.” Sebright is not alone. A broad network of American businesses — from Boeing to FedEx, from JetBlue to a constellation of airport councils and travel services companies — are crying foul against the U.S. carriers. It’s obvious why Boeing is uncomfortable with the U.S. carriers’ effort to limit the Middle Eastern airlines. After all, the Gulf carriers are among the biggest foreign buyers of its aircraft. At the 2013 Dubai Airshow, Emirates and Etihad dazzled the aviation world with some $100 billion in orders for Boeing aircraft. A few months later, Qatar Airways ordered another 50 Boeing aircraft, at a list price of $37.7 billion. If you’re keeping tabs, that’s nearly $140 billion of aircraft orders in less than six months. And between now and 2027, the Gulf carriers will add another 534 new wide-body aircraft to their fleets, according to Credit Suisse. That’s a lot of Boeing and Airbus planes — and lots of American and European manufacturing jobs.
But the story goes deeper than that, and it underscores a cornerstone of U.S. aviation policy: accords known as “open skies” agreements. Since 1992, the United States has negotiated more than 100 such agreements around the world, which are widely credited with expanding the global footprint of the U.S. Big Three. According to the State Department, the policy also benefits American cities like Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit, Las Vegas, Memphis, Minneapolis, Portland, and Salt Lake City, which had virtually no international flights prior to 1992. It’s also a boon to U.S. tourism, air cargo, airports, and the aviation industry writ large.
So are the U.S. carriers trying to constrict their competition? In a word, yes. But are they the equivalent of Radio Shack, stuck in an old model, watching a new world with sleek new players pass them by? Hardly. In fact, the U.S. airline industry performed like gangbusters in 2014, with operating profits at $12 billion for the year — a dramatic turnaround from 2008, when the recession resulted in some $5.6 billion in operating losses. In 2014, American Airlines topped $4.1 billion in net income, Delta reaped $2.8 billion, and United’s profits were nearly $2 billion. The markets also rewarded the airlines: the Bloomberg U.S. Airlines index was up 81 percent last year.
What’s more, the entire industry is headed for a strong 2015. The trade organization Airlines for America’s chief economist, John Heimlich, said that lower oil prices will finally give the U.S. carriers some “breathing room” to reinvest in the product and raise capacity. As for Emirates, its profit for the financial year ending March 31, 2014, was a relatively modest $600 million.
So, why is everyone so afraid of Emirates?
The monster in Dubai
Founded in 1985 in Dubai with two airplanes leased from Pakistan International Airlines, Emirates is now the largest airline in the world in terms of international passengers carried.
In one of the great tales of commercial genesis, Emirates was hatched in a moment of pique: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, then the crown prince of Dubai and now its current ruler, was locked in a battle with a government-owned airline — ironically, in a dispute over open skies. The airline in question was Gulf Air, partly owned by Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Dubai’s neighbor and fellow emirate, Abu Dhabi. Gulf Air was fighting with Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) over landing rights: PIA had played the protectionist card, closing off certain cities to foreign carriers, including Gulf Air.
So Gulf Air asked Dubai authorities to “retaliate” by limiting PIA landings in Dubai, an airport on the rise in the early 1980s. But Sheikh Mohammed refused, according to historian Graeme Wilson in a book about modern Dubai, citing his open-skies policy. Gulf Air hit back, drastically cutting off the number of its flights to Dubai.
Angered, Sheikh Mohammed decided to build his own carrier, commissioning a report from the consultancy Deloitte & Touche on the feasibility of starting a state-owned airline. But the impatient Sheikh Mohammed got antsy and decided he couldn’t wait for the study, Wilson writes in Rashid’s Legacy: The Genesis of the Maktoum Family and the History of Dubai. Instead, he tapped veteran British Airways executive Maurice Flanagan to get started and seeded the fledgling airline with $10 million.
Thus was born Emirates airline. Its first three routes were to Karachi, Mumbai, and Delhi — an early sign that the airline understood the growing clout of emerging markets and Dubai’s strategic potential as a hub for South Asia travel. It soon became clear that the demand for air travel was growing, and Emirates capitalized, opening routes to Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of Asia. By the early 1990s, it had grown into an important player, driven by a team of former British Airways executives and backed by a hyper-ambitious sheikh who understood the value of his geography.
From its Dubai hub, Emirates now flies to 148 destinations across six continents. Its advertisements are ubiquitous at the World Cup, on the U.S. tennis circuit, and in the pages of high-brow magazines. Its “Hello Tomorrow” ad campaign evokes the world of the creative class: globalized, multicultural travelers, attending fashion shows and raves, trolling through neon-lit shopping centers in Tokyo, stealing romantic moments on rooftops in Brooklyn, or jumping on a crowded bus in India. It has become a global brand icon.
Today, Emirates is one of the most significant carriers in several of the fastest-growing markets in Africa, which accounts for about 10 percent of Emirates’ global revenues. According to a study by Oxford Economics, Emirates alone contributes about $800 million to South Africa’s economy. It’s the only international airline that flies to all three of South Africa’s hubs; from Dubai, it also flies directly to 25 destinations across Africa. (Remember the old story of flying from West Africa to East Africa by stopping over in Paris? Now, chances are you’ll be stopping over in Dubai.)
As with all rising companies, Emirates has disrupted an existing market and bloodied the waters for its competitors.
As with all rising companies, Emirates has disrupted an existing market and bloodied the waters for its competitors. Its early success arguably also spawned regional competitors: Qatar Airways (founded in 1993) and Etihad (founded in 2003). Etihad is Abu Dhabi-based and government-owned, and it is driving traffic to its hub in the Emirati capital, linking travelers across what its CEO James Hogan has called “a new Silk Road” of air travel. In that respect, it looks a lot like Emirates. But Etihad does something different: It’s also a major investor in other airlines, rescuing Alitalia from near bankruptcy and taking strategic stakes in carriers from Germany to India. There is more than a tinge of rivalry between Emirates and Etihad, not unlike the underlying historical rivalry between the ruling family of Dubai, the Al Maktoum, and the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, the Al Nahyan (despite the fact that the emirates are part of the same country, each retains a certain amount of autonomy). Indeed, the two airlines compete with each other just as fiercely as, say, American versus United.

Qatar Airways, for its part, is backed by the government of Qatar, the richest country per capita on the planet. Of course, its population is too small to fill up all those airplanes, so it, too, follows a hub-based, long-haul strategy.
State-owned or supported?
In late January, the U.S. carriers’ Fair Skies report outlined some serious charges regarding market-distorting subsidies by their Gulf-based competition: cash injections, interest-free loans, artificially low airport charges, state support for fuel-hedging losses, and non-unionized labor at Gulf airports. The charges against Etihad and Qatar Airways are even more serious: American, Delta, and United claim that those carriers’ accumulated losses mean that neither airline would be in existence without state support.
But the reality is that most airlines around the world began as state-owned enterprises, and many remain so. In a recent speech in Washington, D.C., Hogan noted that his airline is “fully compliant with the international financial reporting standards” and provides “full transparency to the 76 financial institutions which provide us with more than $10.5 billion in loans.” He also noted that none of those loans was backed by sovereign guarantees. “They have committed loans because they have confidence in us and believe in our business model and plan.”
Besides, Hogan said, the U.S. Big Three carry 34 times more passengers than Etihad and were “gifted amazing infrastructure — airports, terminals, slots, landing rights, fuel tax breaks, and more — over decades.”
As for Emirates, they fired back with a glossy white paper of their own, devoting an entire issue of their aviation policy magazine, Open Sky, to a rebuttal of the charges against them. The report noted that Emirates’ services across the United States contribute $2.9 billion to the U.S. economy and that the airline only competes with U.S. carriers on two routes. “Despite what some carriers may think, air passengers are not proprietary to airlines,” it wrote, in a report dripping with a tone of professorial sarcasm toward a daft student. “What Emirates is doing is competing in the marketplace — we don’t ‘take’ or ‘steal’ customers. We offer a great product at a competitive price, which appeals to the consumers who choose to fly with us.”
Emirates refuted all allegations of subsidies, and noted that its success owes to deep emerging markets penetration, such as “305 weekly flights to the five BRICS countries and 94 weekly flights to Pakistan and Bangladesh,” while the three U.S. carriers “offer only modest air services in several of these markets, limiting consumer choice and sacrificing lucrative business.” That sound you hear is an army of lobbyists for the U.S. side preparing a counterpoint. And on it goes.
It’s worth noting that state support is, well, complicated. It’s not as if U.S. carriers take to the skies without their own state-backed safety nets. After the 9/11 attacks, U.S. carriers received some $15 billion in direct cash payments and loan guarantees from Washington. What’s more, the Fly America Actdemands that U.S. government employees use U.S. carriers for domestic and international travel — a boon to the industry. On my regular United Airlines economy-class flights to Dubai, I sit among a virtual army of U.S. military contractors headed to Kabul, Baghdad, and Islamabad via Dubai. According to the General Services Administration, the U.S. government spends awhopping $9 billion on travel. Isn’t that a form of state support?
Washington offers another form of subsidy that helps the American aviation business: The U.S. Export-Import Bank finances the multibillion-dollar purchases of Boeing aircraft by the Gulf “Big Three” — as well as other carriers from around the world. So it’s not Gulf oil money buying these aircraft, but U.S. taxpayer money — repaid at interest, of course. This adds another layer of complexity to the debate.
Seizing the middle seat
At the heart of this air war, however, is a battle for profits: a cutthroat corporate competition to capture the growth of a new global middle class, which is expected to grow from 2 billion to nearly 5 billion by 2030. And where is that middle class growing most rapidly? In emerging markets — mostly Asia — which will account for nearly two out of three members of this new global middle class by 2030.
Emirates and the other Gulf carriers have been chasing the emerging middle class since their inceptions. Consider this: 36 percent of Emirates’ and Etihad’s traffic to the United States comprises travelers from India. For Qatar Airways, that figure is 28 percent. For Etihad, more than 50 percent of passengers traveling to the United States originated in India or Pakistan. Indian airline executives may lament that Emirates has become “the national airline of India,” but Indian travelers have little complaint. The demand is huge: India is on its way to becoming the world’s third-largest aviation market by 2020, with some 85 million international passengers and 336 million domestic passengers per year, according to its Ministry of Civil Aviation.
Clearly, there are a whole lot of South Asians who travel to the United States and Americans of South Asian descent flying to the region. (United is theonly carrier with direct flights to India.) There’s a reason Etihad chose Chicago among its first U.S. destinations: its large Indian-American community. It’s hard to feel sorry for U.S. carriers that largely ignored the Indian and South Asian markets and are now crying foul because Gulf carriers are leveraging them so effectively. As Emirates CEO Tim Clark noted, his company had simply exploited an underserved market: “When the world started to knit together and energize and all these people started traveling, where were the American carriers then?”
Is geography destiny?
The United States has always enjoyed a fortunate political geography — a land blessed by two oceans, far away from the carnage of Europe or the roiling politics of the Middle East and Asia. Economically, politically, and culturally, it’s still the most important country in the world. Naysayers need only observe the long lines of people from around the world who want desperately to immigrate to the United States. With the deepest and most liquid capital markets in the world, the most innovative companies, the best universities, and a political system that — to paraphrase Winston Churchill — is the worst in the world, except for all of the others, don’t bet against America in the long run.
The United States may be the most important country in the world, but the Gulf Big Three carriers are based literally at the center of the world. AMcKinsey map from 2012 outlining the globe’s shifting economic center of gravity shows the weight moving decidedly eastward, currently on a path roughly toward the airport in Dubai.
This spring, I spent an afternoon hopping across terminals in Dubai International Airport to see this global air superhub for myself. Terminal 3, dedicated to Emirates, is massive, glossy, and futuristic — a steel and glass caravansary of the emerging 21st-century New Silk Road. But walking into terminals 1 and 2, you see a grittier side: small airlines with no advertising budgets shuttling travelers across South Asia, Iran, Central Asia, and Africa. Here you see Turkmenistan Airlines, Russia’s Transaero, Nigeria’s Arik Air, Pakistan International Airlines, Afghanistan’s Kam Air, India’s SpiceJet, Saudi Arabia’s Flynas, Ethiopian Airlines, Iran Aseman Airlines, and on and on. On the blinking arrivals and departures screens: Lahore, Aden, Delhi, London, Cairo, Tehran, Muscat, Moscow, Kerman, Kuwait, Hong Kong, Manila, Mumbai, Ahmedabad.
Dubai is often dismissed by its critics as a place lacking in history, a global ingénue with a nouveau riche sensibility. A city can hardly be blamed for its lack of civilizational heft, but what the city and its leaders have done in the aviation space has helped them create a future.
Dubai is often dismissed by its critics as a place lacking in history, a global ingénue with a nouveau riche sensibility. A city can hardly be blamed for its lack of civilizational heft, but what the city and its leaders have done in the aviation space has helped them create a future. Dubai is not oil rich: The black gold accounts for about 2 percent of its GDP. By contrast, aviation accounts for more than a quarter of its GDP, and growing. A recent study points out that, by 2030, aviation will account for 44.7 percent of Dubai’s GDP. Beyond Emirates, there is the Dubai-based low-cost carrier FlyDubai. It’s one of the fastest-growing carriers in the world, often competing with Emirates, but also taking travelers to places its bigger, more glamorous cousin will not: the third- and fourth-tier cities of Africa and Asia.

Then, there’s Dnata, the state-owned airports service provider that offers cargo-handling and catering to airports across Europe and Asia — 72 countries in total. Consider this: Dubai-based Dnata provides catering services for 22 airports across Italy. Yes, Italy. It also does ground handling and cargo and logistics in the Geneva and Zurich airports, and it has completed the trifecta at London Heathrow: ground handling, cargo and logistics, and catering. It also handles services in 16 other airports across Britain, 10 airports in Australia, and one in the United States.
Down the road from Dubai, in the emirate of Sharjah, the low-cost carrier Air Arabia does battle with FlyDubai and has put Sharjah on the regional aviation map. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi International Airport is rising from the desert. It currently serves some 12 million passengers and aims to serve 40 million by 2017. And watch out for Etihad: Its strategy of buying strategic stakes in foreign carriers is quietly making it an aviation powerhouse.
But for dizzying numbers, consider the following: Dubai has opened a new airport that, upon its completion in 2027, will have the annual capacity for 160 million passengers and 12 million metric tons of freight. It will be part of a logistics corridor that will link to Dubai’s Jebel Ali seaport, the world’s ninth-busiest container terminal port. The airport’s name: Al Maktoum International, named after the merchant-prince ruling family.
The United Arab Emirates’ aviation strategy — driven largely by each emirate — may not be a model that everyone can follow, but it’s a good example of an emerging market overachieving. It’s also something that U.S. policymakers should celebrate rather than penalize. The benefits to U.S. industry, consumers, and labor are clear, but there’s something more intangible at play here: In a region littered with economic failure and underperformance, this is a Middle Eastern success story that supports jobs, grows economies, and builds connectivity.
The numbers don’t lie. And at the airport in Dubai, one needn’t do anything more than look around to see the future of emerging-markets travel, of South and Central Asians, Arabs and Iranians, Russians and Africans, Eastern Europeans and Chinese, lining up, boarding their planes, and flying high into the Dubai sky.
Hello Tomorrow.

Is India fuelling unrest in Balochistan?


The brutal massacre last month of 20 innocent labourers hailing mostly from Punjab was not a novel incident. There have been several such incidents over the years in which non-Baloch labourers have been shot dead on ethnic lines. Such killings have mostly been claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which is believed to be an Indian proxy. Giving a policy statement for the first time in 2009, the former interior minister Rehman Malik had told the Senate that “India is involved in Balochistan unrest through BLA, which was established with the blessings of the defunct USSR during Afghan war in the ‘70s”.
This time again, Balochistan Home Minister Sarfaraz Bugti raised his accusing fingers towards India’s RAW for supporting separatists to massacre people on ethnic lines in the province.
India’s involvement in the Balochistan unrest cannot be ruled out in view of the rapidly changing geopolitics of the region. India, which has ambitions of dominating the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, is upset over China’s growing stakes in the Gwadar port. A fully-developed and functional Gwadar port near the Strait of Hormuz enables China to frustrate India’s dream of dominating regional waterways. New Delhi feels that the Gwadar port would have serious strategic implications for India. It perceives that it would empower Pakistan to control strategically important energy sea-lanes on the Persian Gulf, while India controls no choke-points on the coastline of the subcontinent through which international shipping may pass. India sees Chinese involvement in Gwadar with suspicion and believes that China wants to set up bases and outposts across the globe to monitor and safeguard energy flows.
In 2008, the Indian naval chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, expressed concerns over the development of Gwadar port and had said, “Being only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the Straits of Hormuz, Gwadar, being built in Balochistan coast, would enable Pakistan to take control over the world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers.” He said that the challenge for India was to balance relations with China in such a manner that competition for strategic significance of space in the Indian Ocean leads to cooperation rather than conflict. India is developing Iran’s Chabahar port as a competitor to Gwadar port. India’s stake in the Chabahar port is aimed at gaining access to land-locked Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics and bypassing Pakistan in transit trade with Iran and other countries.
It would not be incorrect to say that Balochistan’s troubles owe much to the geopolitics of energy resources. The players of the global energy game are trying to hold stakes in Balochistan, which is considered a strategic part of trans-national pipeline corridors. The province is the key node in the global energy game. The trans-gas pipeline projects and the construction of a seaport, an oil refinery and an oil city in Gwadar can turn Balochistan into an important energy conduit in the region. Separatist groups like the BLA in geo-strategically important ‘energy nodes’ would be the key players in a New Great Game — a power struggle for control of the region’s vast oil and gas reserves.
The viability of a fully functional Gwadar port is threatened by a worsening law and order situation in the province, which faces a host of conflicts: sectarianism, religious extremism and Baloch separatism. The separatists are involved in killing of non-Baloch settlers. Thousands of settlers have left the province in fear and moved to Punjab and other provinces over the years. How can a barber, a miner, a professor or a government servant settled in Balochistan all be usurpers of Baloch rights? The province has suffered decades of neglect and discrimination that has intensified the feeling of alienation among local people. People from every walk of life across the country have been vehemently condemning the injustices meted out to the province for decades. But no Pakistani can ever endorse violence against innocent citizens on ethnic lines in the name of the Baloch struggle by separatists.
It is time for Baloch nationalists to distinguish themselves from separatists whose activities are leading to the branding of the nationalists’ peaceful struggle for political and economic rights as a terrorist movement. The nationalists should vehemently and vociferously condemn acts of terrorism harming their peaceful constitutional struggle.

China reaches out to Indian Ocean through Pakistan

CHINESE President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan for two days on April 21, the first visit of a Chinese president to Pakistan in nine years. Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao reportedly said that this was the President's first foreign trip this year, highlighting the importance Beijing placed on developing Pakistan-China relations in many strategic and economic areas.
The President reportedly committed $46 billion for infrastructure projects taking forward the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor plan which envisages improving road links and connectivity between China's western Xinjiang region, all the way up to the Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea that China has helped finance and manage. (In response to China's moves in Gwadar, India plans to upgrade and operate a deepwater port in Chabahar, Iran, which is located just 50 miles to the west of Gwadar). For Pakistan, the corridor is a cheap way to develop its violence-plagued and poverty-stricken Balochistan province, home to Gwadar.
Furthermore China has been keen to implement the projects of expanding the Karakoram highway, exploring an alternate road link and a railway link from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar.  
The Pakistan-Chinese Economic Corridor project is a part of the Chinese “One Belt One Road” plan which focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic), linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia, and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
Both China and Pakistan have common interests in containing the growing Indian influence in the Indian Ocean region. Both are time-tested and all-weather friends and China has consistently supplied arms and equipment to Pakistan over the years. 
The Chinese president, while at a joint sitting of Pakistan's parliament, described Pakistan as China's "dependable" friend and firmly backed its territorial integrity. Given the state of bilateral relations, it is no wonder that he oversaw the signing of 51 agreements including energy, finance and science and technology and host of other areas. 
China has strategic interests in the Indian Ocean where the interests and influence of India prevail. China and the United States are beginning to overlap to protect sea lanes, a part of Chinese maritime-silk route. It is here that the 21st century's global power dynamics will be revealed, according to many analysts. 
It was reported earlier that China had plans to sell eight submarines (worth $5 billion) to Pakistan and it was not known whether the deal was concluded during the visit. If the deal was done, it would represent a fairly blunt Chinese statement about its willingness to cooperate with Pakistan to challenge Indian maritime power.
It is reported that both sides addressed the issue of a joint China-Pakistan role in Afghanistan following the United States' military withdrawal from that country.
On Beijing's side, authorities are deeply worried about unrest in Xinjiang, which is home to the country's Uighur Muslim minority group who has faced restrictions on religious and cultural practices. Beijing has linked violent attacks in Xinjiang to a group believed to have a stronghold in tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
It is reported that Pakistan has been providing China with intelligence and support in its fight against the organisation known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement which is linked to violent attacks in Xinjiang. There are a considerable number of members of the group in Pakistan.
Hoo Tiang Boon, an assistant professor with the China programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, reportedly said that China's motivation for promoting the Economic Corridor project was to boost economic development in Pakistan. If the Pakistan economy develops, then it would help reduce the problem of terrorism.
China is uncomfortable about the Indo-US alliance to dominate the region. Even though Pakistan received $31 billion from the US since 2002, most of which was allocated to improve security, the government of Pakistan was peeved at President Obama's overlook of the country while he visited India for three days as Guest of Honour for India's Republic Day on January 26.
With the emergence of China as an economic superpower in the region, the Chinese President's visit demonstrates that China and Pakistan enjoy the best of bilateral relations and interactions in strategic and economic matters. It is reported that China with its foreign exchange reserves close to $4 trillion has embarked on “cheque-book diplomacy” providing funds to developing countries to consolidate its relations with them.

Need to Convey Disapproval of Afghan Tilt Towards Pak

The state visit to India from April 27 to 29 of the Afghan President— Ashraf Ghani— did not receive much media attention. This is in part due to the fact that India-Afghan relations have been in the doldrums since his assumption of office in September 2014 and in part because the visit did not inject any new vitality into the relationship.
Much of the fault for the downturn in India-Afghan ties may be attributed to Ashraf Ghani’s moves which are to considerable extent driven by his tilt towards Pakistan. Unlike his predecessor who had over time come to recognise that Pakistan was a part of the problem on the core issue of terrorism facing Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani has chosen to treat Pakistan as a part of the solution.
Accordingly, he has sought to cosy up to the Pakistan by visiting it in November 2014 barely two months after taking over as President, coordinating moves by it against the TTP, refraining from accusing it of the export of terror, pandering to its sensitivities by not seeking military equipment from India, acceding to its request of sending Afghan cadets to it for military training, etc. Indeed, he has gone so far as to make the ridiculous suggestion that the main purveyor of terrorism in Afghanistan is the Islamic State and not the terrorist outfits operating from Pakistan!
If this were not enoughAshraf Ghani’s visit to India comes many months after his assuming office and has been preceded by visits to China, Pakistan, USA, UK and Saudi Arabia. This is, perhaps, in keeping with his statement in Beijing in October 2014 where he placed India in the fourth of the five concentric circles of Afghanistan’s engagement way behind the countries so far visited by him.
The twenty paragraph joint statement issued during Ashraf Ghani’s visit to India is testimony to the absence of any meaningful effort to induce a qualitative upturn in the bilateral relationship. While the joint statement refers to the commitment of both countries to work to strengthen their strategic partnership and their determination to combat the scourge of terrorism this amounts to no more than lip service given that military cooperation with India is now on the backburner and that Afghanistan is seeking to develop a special relationship with Pakistan which is the fount of terror.
In concrete terms, India, apart from gifting three Cheetah helicopters promised some time back, made known its intent to support the Habibia School, over  the next 10 years,  the Afghan Red Crescent Society’s programme to treat Child Congenital Heart disease and the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health for 5 years each. In addition, it indicated that it would extend the 1000 scholarships accorded by it annually till 2016-2017 for a further five years. 
The stalemate in the relationship is reflected in the fact that not a single agreement was inked during the visit. It was, however, agreed that within three months documents relating to an extradition treaty, mutual legal assistance treaties in criminal, civil and commercial matters, agreement on transfer of sentenced persons, a motor vehicles agreement for regulation of traffic between Afghanistan and India, and an MoU on visa free entry for diplomatic passport holders, would be signed.
The only area of meaningful and visible Afghanistan-India cooperation is on the issue of transit trade where Ashraf Ghani spoke up on the need for Pakistan to permit Afghan trucks to come right up to Attari on the Indian border rather than being stopped at Wagah.
He has also been supportive of the movement of Indian goods through Pakistan. On this basis he has encouraged India’s participation in the Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan Trade and Transit Agreement negotiations with a view to promoting regional trade.
It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that the traditional warmth in India-Afghan ties which had characterised most of the Karzai years and indeed much of independent Afghanistan’s history has suffered a setback with the advent of Ashraf Ghani’s to power.
It is, of course, quite possible that Ashraf Ghani’s tilt to Pakistan may be reversed in the coming months if the latter overplays its hand and does not deliver on promoting the reconciliation being sought by the former with the Taliban. Indeed, as may be recalled Karzai too had leaned towards Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of assuming office. 
Ashraf Ghani’s wooing of Pakistan as well as of China is naturally a matter of concern to India. Our great advantage, however, lies in the reality that we are both loved and respected by the Afghan people. This is as much due to our age old cultural and civilisational links with Afghanistan as well as the enormous goodwill earned by us through the wide ranging and brilliantly executed relief and developmental activities undertaken by us through the length and breadth of the country without much fanfare but directed to benefit the common man.
In the last decade alone India has been the fourth largest donor in Afghanistan  investing over $2billion in a variety of developmental programmes. India will, therefore, always tend to resonate in the Afghan psyche as a friend irrespective of the predisposition of the prevailing leadership. This is something that will ultimately colour the approach of any Afghan leadership.
Notwithstanding our serious concerns about Ashraf Ghani’s dalliance with Pakistan and China we must recognise that we lack the leverages to influence the former to change tack. Accordingly, it is better to be patient rather than proactive. Sooner or later Pakistan’s overweening ambitions will cause it to overplay its hand. Its proclivity to try and create a subservient Afghanistan will lead it to adopt policies which will inevitably cause Ashraf Ghani to revisit his approach towards Pakistan. Till such time India should play it cool and keep a light foot print in Afghanistan much as is being done by the government.
Specifically, while alerting Ashraf Ghani to the dangers of playing footsy with Pakistan and turning a blind eye to its export of terror we should desist from pressuring him in any way or thrusting military assistance on him.
Even the economic cooperation programmes devised by us should be minimal and non intrusive. This is all the more so as with increasing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan Indian personnel in that country will be at greater risk.
Such programmes as we undertake in Afghanistan should henceforth be merely geared to keeping our key projects energised. This will naturally lead to a decline in our economic assistance to Afghanistan which is all to the good as it will convey our disapproval of its tilt towards Pakistan.  

Indo-Pakistan relations: On-off-off-on quotient needs to be changed

To engage or not to engage Pakistan in dialogue has now become a challenging poser for the Modi led government as it completes one year in office. The euphoric beginning with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif braving the wrath of the other more powerful Sharif and the summer heat, to attend the swearing-in of PM Modi lost its lustre soon enough. The incessant cross-border firing by Pakistan and mindless pandering of Hurriyat separatists by the Pakistan High Commission in India heralded a premature end for the bonhomie. PM Modi was left with no option but to express himself thus, “Do you think it is possible to have a discussion amidst the deafening noise of bomb blasts and gunshots? So, to have a reasonable discussion, first the blasts and gunshots have to stop.” The traditional on-off-off-on relation between India and Pakistan has witnessed no change in the preceding year since the NDA government has taken oath of office. If one were to cut out the rhetoric it would become quite apparent that there is no paradigm shift in positions taken by both India and Pakistan post Modi and Nawaz Sharif governments coming into power in the two countries. One should not forget that the UPA government had also opted for a breakdown in the talks after a number of unsavoury incidents like the Mumbai terror attack, beheading of an Indian soldier along the line of control etc, only to relent after some time and resume the dialogue. The dialogue, by itself, does not seem to be making much headway. Pakistan has still not granted to India the much awaited and reciprocal “Most Favoured nation” status; the country has made no attempt to meet India’s justified demands of punishing those involved in the Mumbai terror attack and stopping terror activities against India from Pakistan soil, among many other issues. Undoubtedly there is a strong case for not holding a dialogue till such time that Pakistan does not meet the preconditions laid down by India over the years and especially so, by the NDA government. After all, for how long can India tolerate Pakistan’s assault on her sovereignty and its indulgence in deceitful diplomacy which leads to a palpable trust deficit between the two countries. Some in India argue that the two countries should go their own ways and not engage with each other till such time that a new, more tolerant, generation comes by. In other words, give each other space and time to breathe. The question is - would the fundamentalist leaders in Pakistan ever allow a tolerant attitude towards India gain a firm footing in Pakistan? The anti-India tirade by fundamentalist leaders like Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar is carried extensively by the Pakistan media, especially the Urdu press, to create an unassailable environment of hatred on religious grounds. Instead of being jailed for their criminal terrorist activities against India these rabid elements are given a free run. A few people of the elite in Pakistan may be motivated towards emancipated thinking but the larger majority continues to look towards India as enemy number one. Not talking would give a clear run to the radical forces in Pakistan to whip up anti-India sentiment to an extent that reconciliation in the future will become next to impossible. There are, however, some strong reasons that justify keeping the door of dialogue open. The two countries have a festering border dispute; there are Indian areas like Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan under illegal occupation of Pakistan, the people of these areas are being denied their rights and are being persecuted. Mistreatment of minorities in Pakistan to include Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Ahmedias, Shias, Hazaras and other non Sunni segments of the population is also something that India needs to involve itself with at the bilateral as well as the international level. The best way to address these and other such issues is diplomacy, not war and conflict. The nuclear status of the two countries makes the need for dialogue even more urgent, communication has to remain open to avoid a possible accident that would cause untold damage. The international concern for the nuclear flashpoint status of the sub-continent has to be addressed more by India being the more mature yet dominant and powerful nation. Good relations with Pakistan can reap tremendous gains. The two countries have common issues of terrorism, radicalism, poverty, health care and development to tackle; if by any means the two countries can set aside their differences and engage in a beneficial manner the people will benefit tremendously. India being the bigger power has to show magnanimity and as such the responsibility to absorb negativity and exude positivity falls on the country. If India does what Pakistan is dong than what would be the difference between the two? “In politics there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; there are only permanent interests.” There is no harm in making an effort to go beyond the rigidity that has been manifest by the bureaucracy of the two countries and those in the political spectrum who have an interest in keeping the pot boiling. Some bold and statesmanlike decisions may change the course of history. Of course, all this cannot be done immediately, diplomacy has to be played out with a gradual step by step approach, but if the political will is there a lot many hurdles can be crossed. India needs to find solutions that go beyond negative posturing by Pakistan. Pakistan, of course, has a bigger role to play in changing the negative mindset against India that has gained firm roots in the country over many decades through misinformation and misrepresentation of facts. At the same time the interests, stature, dignity and sovereignty of the country have to be kept paramount. (Dr. Simrit Kahlon is an academician with keen interest in geo-strategy)

From eternal rivalry to a productive relationship?




The PML-N government can justifiably take credit for forging closer strategic and economic ties with China. With Washington, too, our relations — that went through a record low after the raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad in 2011 — have improved and there is a greater level of understanding and cooperation. This is a significant progress considering that it is never easy to satisfy the demands of a superpower. Pakistan is also making sincere efforts at opening a new chapter in its relations with Afghanistan by breaking away from the prejudices and misgivings of the past. Our political leadership has gone out of its way to remove the misunderstandings with Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries that arose from our policy of staying away from the Yemen conflict. Hopefully, the new gestures and renewed pledges to stand with Saudi Arabia in the event its integrity is challenged should fully restore the confidence of our strategic ally.
But with India, it is a different story. Despite Nawaz Sharif’s sincere efforts at breaking the deadlock, India’s intransigence continues. It has taken the stance that unless Pakistan makes good on its commitment to pursue the case against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage, there will be no serious engagement. In the last few months, however, there have been feeble attempts on both sides to break the stalemate. When Pakistan took a position that as it was India that had suspended the dialogue, it should take the initiative of re-engaging with us, the BJP government took the hint and under the umbrella of Saarc, the Indian foreign secretary visited Islamabad. In the absence of any follow-up, Nawaz Sharif, in an interview to the Saudi media recently, expressed his deep frustration over the lack of reciprocity on the part of the Indian government to Pakistan’s overtures.
It is, however, important to appreciate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is basing his hardline attitude on the premise that Pakistan continues to support the Lashkar–e-Taiba (LeT) or its new incarnation and gives protection to the very group that has committed the Mumbai carnage.
The Mumbai controversy is a symptom of the complex relations between the two countries. It is also an expression of the inner contradictions within the power structure of Pakistan that New Delhi fully exploits to its advantage. For Islamabad to keep on harping that the military and civilian leaderships are on the same page on foreign policy issues, and especially as it relates to India, will be a travesty of judgment. We also need to acknowledge that India has made progress on the Mumbai case a litmus test of our sincerity towards normalising relations. Consequently, a more sophisticated approach in redressing New Delhi’s genuine grievances will have to be adopted. One appreciates that Pakistan’s military, which is already stretched to its limit fighting on three fronts, cannot be expected to open another new front and confront the LeT at this juncture. But the question is, even if Pakistan were to largely overcome its internal threats, would its policy be any different if the military continues to monopolise power? Ironically, the current reality is that a deteriorating relationship compels Pakistan to focus on India rather than fully concentrate on its primary threat emanating from insurgencies. Besides, in a tension-ridden environment, any militant incident, by design or by default, could escalate into a dangerous scenario between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The more immediate impact of this rivalry would be on the stability of Afghanistan and the region.
All this leads to the conclusion that a confrontational relationship with India in the longer term would be self-destructive. All the gains that are supposed to accrue from improved relations with China and other major powers as a consequence could be diluted.
The establishment’s dominance in influencing policy towards India complicates matters. On the one hand, the military’s preoccupation with fighting on multiple fronts detracts from opening another one with India. But the establishment is also fiercely opposed to Nawaz Sharif making any significant overtures towards normalisation. Its only interest is that the relations remain at a tactical level where there is no war and no peace, a situation that in the long term is untenable. In fact, its reaction to Nawaz Sharif’s peace initiatives in the first year of his assuming office were so strong that it would not have hesitated in destabilising the government if he had unilaterally continued on that path. The earlier moves by Nawaz Sharif to grant the MFN status to India were looked at with great disdain and blocked. As of now, there is a common perception that narrow institutional interests are a major impediment for Nawaz Sharif to proceed on a conciliatory path with India. In such a situation, the Indian leadership perhaps, considers it futile to respond to the prime minister’s overtures when it knows that it is not him but the establishment that dictates relations with India and is blocking any initiatives towards moving forward. The previous Congress government in India advanced a similar argument to maintain the stalemate.
Relations with India, apart from having a direct impact on regional peace and economic progress, also directly influence civil-military relations in the negative. Modi takes full advantage of this by maligning Pakistan for the dysfunctional civil-military relations and uses these as a cover for his hard policy towards Pakistan. What is generally overlooked is that this hard position enables India to keep suppressing the Kashmiris. The international community looks the other way as the commercial and strategic interests of the West take precedence over human rights and universal principles of justice. On the contrary, in Pakistan, the beneficiaries of New Delhi’s belligerence are the jihadi groups. They widen their support base by highlighting India’s injustices in Kashmir. In both scenarios, it is Pakistan that is at a loss as the jihadi elements are destabilising it internally and projecting a negative image of the country internationally.
Improvement in India-Pakistan relations can be a game-changer for Pakistan and the region. This will require a qualitative change in mindset and policies, which regrettably as of now, are not on the horizon.

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